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Abstract  
 
This research is a qualitative study of barriers to incident reporting at The 
Christie NHS Foundation Trust (The Christie). The conceptual framework 
was based on models such as the cultural web and Senge (fifth discipline). 
The E-V-R congruence model formed the basis of the framework and 
includes identified barriers to incident reporting from the literature review. 
The following barriers were identified from the literature: a lack of clarity 
about what to report, lack of anonymity, no feedback, a culture of blame and 
fear.  
The research methodology employed a number of different research 
methods to achieve triangulation and to ensure the reliability and validity of 
the research. Methodologies included the use of self-completion 
questionnaires, semi-structured interviews and secondary data taken from 
the NHS National Staff Survey, 2008. 
Using the conceptual framework a number of barriers to incident reporting 
were identified at The Christie. These barriers include:  
• Staff are too busy to report incidents 
•  A lack of clarity about what to report 
• Staff find it difficult to report senior members of staff 
• A lack of feedback 
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• The form takes too long to complete 
It was also established that there is a ‘fair blame’ culture at The Christie, and that 
there is a lack of learning from incidents.   
The following recommendations were made: 
• Raise awareness of incident reporting and provide clear guidelines on what 
constitutes a reportable incident.  
• Introduce a feedback mechanism that links the original reporter to an 
incident. 
• Communicate the changes that result from incidents and improve the 
communication process across the Trust. 
• Review the incident report form (IRF) and make it easier to complete. 
• Introduce a web based incident reporting system. 
• Introduction of a confidential helpline linked to the Governance team 
• Develop an incident reporting training package  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background 
This dissertation is a qualitative study of barriers to incident reporting within the 
National Health Service (NHS), with particular emphasis on The Christie NHS 
Foundation Trust. The Christie is the largest single site cancer treatment centre in 
Europe.  
In the author’s role of Blood Transfusion Manager at the Christie NHS Foundation 
Trust, it appeared that a number of clinical incidents did not seem to have been 
reported.  This raised the issue of whether barriers exist which actually prevent 
people from reporting clinical incidents in the NHS or whether it is  just a case of 
some employees not doing what they know they are supposed to do?  This 
question is of interest to the organisation because either way, NHS managers will 
have to find ways to overcome this issue.  
In order to appreciate the context within which the research is based, the 
introduction provides an overview of the NHS and the background to The Christie 
(the organisation under review). It also outlines the research problem, its strategic 
importance and the aims and objectives of the study.  
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1.2 Rationale behind the Research 
Clinical incident management is an essential component of quality patient care. An 
"incident” is described by National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA, 2004) as; 
“Any event which has actually, or could potentially, lead to unintended harm to a person i.e.  
adverse events (harm caused) and near misses (no harm caused to patients)  to one or more 
persons receiving NHS care” (NPSA, 2004, page 1). 
There is a legal requirement to report all adverse events associated with the use of 
medicinal products and devices to the Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory 
Agency (MHRA). The MHRA is the government agency which is responsible for 
ensuring that medicines and medical devices work, and are acceptably safe. 
However, the Government considers that the NHS incident reporting systems 
currently provide an incomplete picture of the scale and nature of failures in health 
care (Department of Health (DH), 2000).  
This perspective on incident reporting led the Government to introduce the NPSA; 
which was responsible for setting up a National Reporting and Learning System 
(NRLS) to encourage the reporting of all patient safety incidents from NHS 
organisations in England and Wales in 2004. Whilst this reporting is beneficial for 
trend analysis, the agency does not verify the level and nature of reported incidents 
and the statistics may therefore not necessarily be a true reflection of the   
incidents occurring in an organisation.  
The NPSA provides feedback reports (twice yearly) through the NRLS of patient 
safety incidents that have been reported from NHS organisations of similar size for 
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comparison. Appendix A shows the types of incidents that are contained in the 
NRLS report (NRLS, 2008). 
A report, issued by the NPSA (2008), compared the number of patient safety 
incident reports at The Christie with that of other similar sized hospitals in England 
and Wales, between October 2007 and March 2008.The report identified the 
following key areas of concern: 
1. The Christie was not reporting regularly to the NRLS. Appendix B shows 
that no reports were submitted to NRLS for December 2007, February and 
March 2008. However, these reports were submitted in May 2008 and were 
therefore included in the figures for the actual number of incidents occurring 
at The Christie between October 2007 and March 2008 (appendix C). 
2. The level of incident reporting at The Christie is below that expected for a 
trust of its size (figure 1). 
 
                             Hospitals of a similar size to The Christie 
The Christie NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Figure 1: Ranking of hospitals based on the incident reporting rates at The Christie compared 
to other hospitals (Source: NPSA Report October 2007 to March 2008) 
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The NPSA report (2008) calculated the minimum expected level of incident 
reporting which should occur at The Christie. This was calculated by assessing 
the admission data (appendix C) and the total number of patient safety 
incidents reported between October 2007 and March 2008 (appendix A).  
According to a large scale international case note review, one in ten hospital 
patients suffer adverse events which result in some harm to the patient (NPSA, 
2004). The NPSA findings were supported by other studies (Brennan 1991, 
Leape 1991, Wilson et al 1999, Davis 2003, Baker et al 2004 and Schioler et al 
2001). Figure 2 shows the proportion of patients who experienced adverse 
events during hospital admission in an international study conducted in 2004 by 
the NPSA. Variations in the findings may be due to the fact that various 
definitions of adverse events exist across the world. Other large scale studies 
conducted in the United States and Australia revealed that 3-17% of all 
hospitalisations resulted in medical error (cited in Inoue and Koizumi, 2004). 
 
Countries / regions involved in the study  
Figure 2: Proportion of patients who experience adverse events from 
seven studies (Source: NPSA, 2004) 
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Based on the NPSA figures (2004), the level of incident reporting at The 
Christie should equate to 10% of the total number of admissions. However, the 
level of reporting in March 2008 at The Christie was 8% which could be as a 
consequence of ‘underreporting’ (figure 1). Other factors which may have 
contributed to the lower than expected levels of incident reporting include: 
• Data from The Christie may be missing from the NRLS database, so 
figures may not be accurate for The Christie NHS Foundation Trust. 
• The lack of incidents reported may be due to the nebulous nature of local 
policies. If polices are not explicit about what constitutes a reportable 
incident, then staff following these policies may have uncertainty which 
could result in incidents not being reported. Also if policies are not 
shared with ‘frontline’ staff or access is restricted then this could also 
prevent incident reporting. 
• Finally it could be that The Christie has already made greater 
improvements in patient safety compared to other hospitals, and 
therefore reporting rates are lower than that expected by the NPSA.  
 
In March 2008, the NHS Confederation briefing paper outlined that Trusts which 
reported high levels of patient safety incidents suggested a strong organisational 
culture of safety because they had taken all incidents seriously and link reporting 
with learning (NPSA, 2008). A key role for clinical managers is to ensure that 
incidents are reported, lessons are learned and findings disseminated to improve 
patient care. 
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The reporting system is reliant on individuals within hospitals submitting reports 
when incidents occur and then incidents being reported by the Trust to external 
agents. Individuals within organisations may have barriers to incident reporting and 
therefore measurements by the government’s agencies would not be accurate. The 
literature considers that there are considerable barriers to staff participation in 
incident reporting and significant levels of ‘under-reporting’ in the NHS (Barach and 
Small 2000, Coles, 2005).   
Understanding incident reporting behaviour of NHS clinical staff may improve risk 
management, and could create an open reporting and learning culture. This could 
in turn reduce the risk of harm to patients as learning from mistakes is important in 
maintaining and improving the quality of care in the NHS (Lawton and Parker, 
2002).   
Risk Management is about the culture, processes and structures that are directed 
towards realising potential opportunities whilst managing adverse incidents 
(Governance in the New NHS, Health Service Circular 1999/123). For an overview 
of The Christie’s Risk Management internal reporting structure see appendix D. 
1.3 The Strategic Importance of the Research Question 
Identifying barriers to incident reporting would allow managers to address issues 
and become fully aware of the risks the organisation faces.  Lessons could be 
learnt therefore preventing serious harm to patients. This is strategically important 
for the following reasons:  
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• Risk to The Christie’s reputation- Reputation is the strategic standing of the 
organisation in the eyes of its customers and other stakeholders (Lynch, 
2006). Reputation is the biggest risk to a company’s market value 
(Forstmoser, 2006). The Christie’s reputation is very strong, and would be 
damaged if a patient died as a result of an incident. A strong reputation 
takes a long time to build, but stakeholder confidence can be undermined as 
a result of a single catastrophic adverse incident.  
 
• Risk to the strategic development of The Christie- Strategic intent is the 
“nature and the direction that an organisation takes to attain the long term strategic 
position” (Morden, 2007 page 446).  A corporate objective of The Christie is 
the development of a network of Christie branded cancer services at other 
hospitals.  If Christie’s reputation is damaged by adverse incidents, then 
secondary hospitals may not wish to be associated with The Christie brand 
and may object to the development of the Christie networked cancer 
services at their hospital.  
• Risk of Financial Loss- Finance is an important resource of any 
organisation. Adverse clinical incidents can result in a loss of revenue as 
compensation payments are made. Also the cost of NHS litigation insurance 
may become a significant burden to the Trust if liabilities are not managed. 
For example if a Trust was unable to maintain a NHSLA level 3 (the highest 
level) and was accessed as a level 2 it would cost the trust a premium of 
£250,000 per level (McIlwain, 2006) therefore resulting in a final loss of 
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£250,000 per year (until the level 3 status was regained). Financial 
instability would also put the Trust’s Foundation status at risk, if the Trust 
was unable to remain financially viable and make a profit. See appendix E 
for profit and loss account 2007/08, showing that a 5.3 million pound surplus 
was made. The financial position of The Christie may not be as strong as it 
first appeared due to the collapse of the Icelandic banks and the potential 
loss of £6 million.  
One corporate objective of a Foundation Trust is to make a profit. Another 
corporate objective is the further development of the private work carried out by 
the Trust. This is important because there is an assumption that patients paying 
directly for their treatment are more likely to transfer to another hospital if 
quality of the service does not meet their expectations. 
1.4 National Context-The Structure of the NHS 
The NHS can be divided into two strands; one area is responsible for developing 
strategy and the other deals with clinical aspects of care. The latter can be further 
divided into primary care trusts (PCT), for example GPs. Secondary care, for 
example, hospitals, is accessed via GP referral (Figure 3). Tertiary care hospitals 
take referrals from secondary care hospitals and have specialised doctors dealing 
with rare conditions. The Christie is an example of tertiary care. 
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Including Tertiary care 
 
Figure 3: The Structure of the NHS in England (source: DH, 2008) 
 
1.5 The Christie NHS Foundation Trust 
 
The Christie is an international leader in cancer research and development. It is the 
lead cancer centre for a network of services serving 3.2 million people across 
Greater Manchester and Cheshire and has a strong reputation across the UK. 
Within the local health economy are 11 PCTs, the commissioning arm of the NHS, 
and 15 secondary trusts.  The local health economy is part of the North West 
Strategic Health Authority which serves the health needs of 6.7 million people.  
Demand for tertiary cancer centre services is increasing nationally, particularly in 
Greater Manchester and the North West. Based on the estimated number of new 
cancer patients each year, The Christie’s potential market is currently 77% of all 
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new patients within the Greater Manchester and Cheshire cancer network, 43% of 
all new patients across the North West, and 5% of new patients nationally. The 
projected rise in demand is an opportunity for The Christie NHS Foundation Trust, 
as the major provider of tertiary cancer services in the North West, to increase its 
market share. The Christie became a Foundation Trust in April 2007 and now has 
the freedom to capitalise on market opportunities.  
The North West has three tertiary cancer centres: Clatterbridge Oncology Centre 
on the Wirral, the Rosemere Centre in Preston and The Christie NHS Foundation 
Trust. There is clearly competition in this field. To a lesser extent there is also 
competition from secondary hospitals that have their own oncology department.  
Therefore the quality of care provided at The Christie is crucial if it is to remain 
profitable. 
1.6 Research Aims and Objective 
 
The primary aim of the study is to identify if there are barriers to incident reporting 
at The Christie NHS Foundation Trust. The study will also focus to a lesser extent 
on associated areas such as the culture of organisational learning in relation to 
incident reporting.  
 There are three objectives of this research study: 
1. To identify the general issues which influence clinical incident reporting 
in the NHS, through a literature review. 
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2. To identify barriers to incident reporting at The Christie and assess the 
culture of learning from incidents.  
3. To assess the range of strategic/operational choices available to reduce 
identified barriers to incident reporting, to examine the factors affecting 
implementation of strategic/operational choice, draw conclusions and 
make recommendations. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter one, this study focuses on the barriers to incident reporting 
in the NHS with specific reference to The Christie NHS Foundation Trust. To 
analyse this topic a number of models were considered to develop a conceptual 
framework. The models reviewed were predominantly developed from research in 
the areas of strategic management and organisational learning. The models were 
selected because of their potential to capture the multi-factorial issues which exist 
in the NHS and to address the dissertation objectives listed in Chapter 1.  
 
2.2 Models assessing the external factors of incident reporting 
EVR congruence model 
The first model to be considered to identify the contextual factors which impact on 
barriers to incident reporting was E-V-R (environment-values-resources) 
congruence. This model provides an ideal framework for examining what 
managers must achieve strategically in order to create and sustain organisational 
effectiveness and success. E-V-R shows how the environment is a source of 
opportunities and threats - external key success factors; and that resources 
constitute strengths and weaknesses, strategic competencies which either match, 
or fail to match, environmental needs (figure 4) (Thompson, 2001).If an 
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organisation focuses on the internal environment only, this can result in strategic 
drift (Johnson and Scholes , 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: E-V-R congruence model (Source: Thompson, 2001) 
 
 
The E-V-R congruence model enables managers to bring together the issues from 
the external environment and match them with the internal resources and values. 
The greater the congruence the greater the likelihood that the organisation is 
managing resources to match key success factors dictated by the environment 
(Thompson, 2001). However, the application of EVR is time consuming. Another 
limitation of this model is the failure to recognise the impact of leadership in 
preventing strategic drift (Author, 2009).  
STEEPLE Analysis 
The business environment of an organisation consists of all the external influences 
that affect its decisions and performance (Grant, 2008). STEEPLE analysis 
Value 
Environment 
Opportunities 
and Threats 
 Resources 
Strengths and 
Weakness 
The 
Strategy 
SWO
T 
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identifies seven driving forces for change (Socio-cultural, Technological, 
Economical, Environmental, Political, Legal and Ethical) which give a macro 
analysis of the organisation and can be applied to any organisation (Morden, 
2007). This framework can be used to identify future trends in the aforementioned 
areas.  
 
The STEEPLE model can be applied to The Christie and provides the key drivers 
for changes in incident reporting, and this is an important model when considering 
the development of an adverse incident reporting policy. 
 
STEEPLE analysis allows a large number of variables to be organised, however, 
given the large number of external influences it is not possible to analyse them all. 
The limitation of the framework is that it can result in information overload and it 
may not be cost effective to collect. The framework does not help managers 
differentiate vital information from others and therefore does not help managers 
reach strategic decisions. The model assumes that external forces will fit neatly 
into these ‘boxes’ and takes little account of issues which cross boundaries, 
external drivers may be a cause of confusion.  
SWOT Analysis 
 
SWOT is an abbreviation for Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats. A 
SWOT analysis summarises the key issues from the business environment and the 
strategic capability of an organisation which impact on the strategic development 
(Johnson and Scholes, 2006). This model is useful as a basis through which to 
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generate strategic options (Johnson and Scholes, 2006). A criticism of this model 
is that it is not absolute and requires comparison of an organisation with 
competitors.  
The previous three models are relevant to the research questions, because they 
can all be applied to the NHS without any difficulty; therefore are integrated to form 
the basis of the conceptual framework. 
2.3 Major issues associated with incident reporting and barriers 
to incident reporting 
 
Studies from across the world have shown that clinical mistakes are a major threat 
to patient care (World Health Organisation, 2004). In NHS hospitals adverse 
events occur in approximately one in ten patients admitted, resulting in a payout of 
around £400 million a year in settlement of clinical negligence claims (DH, 2000). 
However, according to a large scale study by Bolsin et al (2007) the annual cost of 
adverse events in healthcare is “approximately £9 billion in the USA, £8 billion in 
Australia and £6 billion in the UK”. According to the NPSA up to a half of these 
incidents could have been prevented (NPSA, 2003).  
Research suggests that these figures give no indication of the potential true scale 
of the problem because of the underreporting of clinical incidents (Firth-Cozens et 
al, 2004, O’Dowd, 2006).This confirms the findings of a number of other authors 
(Rennie et al 2002; Firth- Cozens, 2002, Goldie et al, 2003). 
In figure 5 the iceberg represents the total numbers of incidents which occur in the 
NHS. Errors may be intercepted before they affect the patient. Errors that do reach 
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the patient may be unnoticed. Some errors that are noticed may not be reported 
where the patient has not come to any harm. In cases where a patient has 
experienced an untoward event as a result of an error the incident is more likely to 
be reported (DH, 2004). 
 
 
In figure 5 the number of unreported errors outweighs the actual number of errors 
reported. Understanding why incidents occur is important and could reduce the 800 
patient deaths which occur as a result of avoidable clinical incidents each year 
(NPSA, 2005).  
2.4 Aetiology of Incidents 
 
Incidents are the result of unplanned deviations in system operation, (Koorneef and 
Hale 1997). These deviations initiate an undesired process which, if not stopped, 
can result in an incident (Hendrick 1987). Understanding why incidents occur is 
now being appreciated in many health systems across the world (DH, 2001). 
Research shows that organisations with a high level of reported incidents (above 
Reported 
Errors that cause actual 
Figure 5: Incident reporting iceberg (taken from DH, 2004) 
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10%) have developed a strong reporting culture (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001).This is 
an important point for consideration as human decisions and actions play a 
fundamental role in nearly all incidents( DH,2000). 
 
Reason (2005) defined human error as “The failure of planned actions to achieve their 
desired goal” (Reason, 2005, page 57). Reason’s model of organisational accident 
causation was originally developed for use in complex industrial systems, as a means 
of understanding the relationships between the various factors involved in the 
genesis of accidents and to identify methods of accident prevention (Figure 6).  
 
In Reason’s (2005) explanation of this model, he identifies several concepts that are 
needed to understand the aetiology of organisational accidents.  These include the 
following: 
• Organisational issues 
• Workplace  factors 
• Person  
•  Breached defences  
 
Figure 6 recognises that organisational processes have a direct bearing on how 
accidents develop in organisations. Decisions taken at the highest level (Trust Board) 
of an organisation - whilst well thought out can be incorrect and therefore create the 
potential for latent problems within the organisation. Latent failures create 
weaknesses which increases the probability of unsafe acts occurring. If control 
systems are ineffective the outcome is an incident.    
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Figure 6:  Accident causation model (Source: Reason, 2005) 
 
As well as latent failures there are also ‘active failures’. These are unsafe acts 
committed by those at the ‘sharp end’ of the system and whose actions can have 
immediate adverse consequences (NPSA, 2004).Reason defines two main types of 
‘Unsafe Act’: errors and violations (figure 7). 
 
Figure 7:  Error Types (Source: Reason, 1995)  
Errors can be due to skill-based attention slips and memory lapses.  These involve 
the unintended deviation of actions from what may have been a perfectly good plan 
ERROR TYPES
  Unsafe
acts
  Unsafe
acts
Unintended
actions
Intended
actions
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Rule based
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(Reason, 1995). Errors caused by distraction and interruption are difficult to eliminate 
completely; therefore these are difficult to control.  
 
It is impossible to eliminate all risks (Richardson, 2002) especially human error. 
Errors can never be eliminated by any amount of training, knowledge or motivation, 
although these can make error far less likely. Adverse events are rarely the result of a 
single error or factor (Gault, 2003) as shown in figure 7.  
 
The accident causation model has been adapted and applied to healthcare setting 
(Vincent et al 1999), taking into account some of the specific characteristics of 
healthcare systems (such as patients, working conditions and equipment) (Vincent et 
al (1999), Stanhope (1997)).In the NHS, adverse incidents are often the result of a 
series of errors or omissions leading up to the critical incident itself (DH, 2004) as 
depicted by the ‘Swiss cheese model’ (Reason, 1997 cited in DH 2000). 
 
Figure 8 shows the ‘Swiss cheese model’ of system failure applied to medication 
errors (Schwartz and Brodowy, 1995). Each slice of cheese represents a barrier 
Figure 8: The ‘Swiss Cheese’ model (Source: Reason 1997 cited in DH, 2000) 
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against error. Ideally all the defences should be intact, but in reality the layers have 
many holes. An error may get through holes in one or more layers of defence but 
be stopped at another stage in the process. The more layers of defence there are, 
the lower the likelihood of holes in those defences opening up, the lower the risk of 
an error occurring. Holes in the defences open up as a result of active failures and 
latent conditions as discussed earlier. 
 
The model is of value to the NHS as both the NHS and other high risk 
organisations (aviation, nuclear and petrochemical) rely on the interaction of 
humans and equipment to operate efficiently. Healthcare can learn much from 
aviation (Leape, 1994, DH, 2000, Helmreich, 2002).Human error remains a 
significant causal factor in the majority of aviation incidents (Thomas, 2004). To 
reduce incidents in the NHS, there has been the development of Clinical Risk 
Management (CRM) over the last thirteen years. 
 
2.5 Clinical Risk Management 
 
Risk is defined as “the possibility of incurring misfortune or loss” (Collins 
Dictionary). In the NHS, risk management is mainly concerned with harnessing 
information which can reduce loss of life, financial loss and loss of reputation. This 
information can be gained from the reporting of clinical incidents; however, under-
reporting of incidents prevents the gathering of vital information and puts patients’ 
lives at risk. 
Risk management in the NHS is an evolving process that has little empirical work 
to inform its progress (Dickson et al, 2004); a review of the literature has 
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highlighted a limited theoretical base. There is a lack of a scientific foundation for 
the design of risk management training programmes (Thomas, 2004). 
Nonetheless, error management supported by incident reporting can provide a 
useful framework within which the NHS can focus efforts to enhance patient safety. 
 
The use of a risk matrix (NPSA, 2008) (figure 9) when coupled with a risk register 
(a list of organisational risks) is valuable as it aids when planning a risk strategy.  
However, the use of this tool is dependent on adequate and reliable data from 
incident reports. 
 
 
2.6 Incident Reporting  
 
According to DH (2000) the NHS positions on incident reporting are as follows: 
avoidable failures occur, untoward events recur and incidents which result in 
lapses in standards of care in one or more health organisations. These do not 
reliably lead to corrections throughout the NHS. Models to improve incident 
reporting have been originally developed outside of the NHS. 
Figure 9: Risk matrix (Source: NPSA, 2008) 
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The Heinrich pyramid was developed based on work in aviation and has shaped 
the current work in incident reporting (Connolly, 2006) Figure 10. Heinrich 
estimated a ratio in industry of one major injury and 29 minor injuries to 300 no-
injury accidents. To some extent the health of a reporting system can be judged by 
the proportion of minor incidents to more serious reported incidents and accidents: 
the greater the proportion of minor incidents reported, the better the reporting 
system is working. 
 
Figure 10: Heinrich pyramid (Source: DH, 2000) 
Incident reporting has been identified as a key factor in establishing an effective 
risk management culture (Darren, 2006) and is a key aspect of NHS clinical 
governance (DH, 2000). Most hospitals in the US and UK are currently introducing 
risk management activities, for example, the reporting of near misses 
(Wollersheim, 2007). 
 
According to Cook (2000), no research has proved the effectiveness of near miss 
reporting in patient care. However, experience in other sectors demonstrates the 
value of ‘near miss’ reporting the NHS does not compare well with best practice in 
other areas (DH, 2000).  
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Reporting systems are vital for providing information on which to base trend 
analysis and recommendations. At The Christie a paper report system is used 
(Appendix I) which is then put into a computer system by a member of the risk 
team.  The form takes a long time to complete; sometimes incomplete forms are 
submitted. There is often a time-lag between incidents being reported and further 
discussion about them.  Also such reporting systems are dependent on the 
willingness of staff to complete them. Incident reporting is used predominantly by 
nurses (Johnson, 2003, Kingston et al, 2004). The introduction of an online 
reporting system at St Mary’s NHS Trust in London resulted in an increase in 
reporting from medical staff, because it gives guidance on completing the form 
(Anderson, 2007).Similar findings were reported in a Japanese hospital (Nakajima, 
2005).  
 
2.7 Underreporting of Incidents 
 
Underreporting is an organisational wide issue in the NHS and is a barrier to 
improving patient safety (Firth-Cozens, 1997, O’Dowd, 2006).This underreporting 
is not only a problem for the UK; Barach and Small (2000) reported that 
“underreporting of adverse events in the USA is 50-96% annually”. In the UK a 
million healthcare incidents were reported in 2006, but it was estimated that 22% of 
incidents and 39% of near misses were unreported (O’Dowd, 2006). Although 
some professional groups are governed by codes of practice, underreporting is 
considered the norm in the NHS (Attree, 2007). This is because an atmosphere 
that supports the reporting of errors has not been developed in the NHS (Ajeneye, 
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2008). In fact, reporting adverse events should be thought of as a standard duty of 
care (Bolsin, 2007).  
 
Nursing and Midwifery Council’s (2002) professional code specifies the need to 
raise concerns in particular incident reporting. In medicine similar responsibilities 
are outlined by the General Medical Council (2001). Pharmacy staff for example, 
have clear directions with respect to incident reporting in the codes of ethics for 
pharmacists and pharmacy technicians (Pharmaceutical Journal, 2005). The 
Health Professions Council, (2008) provides guidance to the professions allied to 
medicine; however, there is no mention of incident reporting in their standards. 
This allows the development of local standards on this issue and therefore reduces 
clarity on incident reporting.   
 
2.8 Barriers to Incident Reporting 
 
A review of the literature provided a comprehensive overview of the diverse factors 
identified in research affecting willingness of hospital staff to report incidents. 
However, most of the literature refers specifically to nurses and doctors; there is a 
lack of literature relating to allied health professions such as Radiology, Pathology 
and Pharmacy staff. Also although, there is a large body of literature on medication 
errors, very little is related to the barriers associated with incident reporting.  See 
table 1 for a summary of empirical research on barriers to incident reporting 2000-
2006 and a critique (Author, 2009).  
 
37 
 
There is some controversy around the role of incident reporting and its potential to 
improve patient safety. According to Leape, (2002) “no controlled studies have 
been conducted to test whether improved incident reporting leads to a decrease in 
errors” (page 1633).  There is a growing body of literature that confirms the value 
of incident reporting in reducing the frequency of clinical events (Leape, 2002, 
Wolff, 2001). Reporting incidents in the NHS and other healthcare settings a 
constructive and non-punitive environment will bring about fewer incidents and 
reduce related cost (Bolsin et al, 2007; Clinton, 2006).  
 
One of the first studies to look at barriers to incident reporting (Barach and Small, 
2000) concluded that “few barriers to near miss data collection exist” (page760). 
They suggest that there was a lack of clarity about what constitutes a reportable 
incident and that this was a major barrier to incident reporting. This was a non-
medical study (carried out in the aviation, petrochemical and nuclear power 
industries); the findings were extrapolated (by Barach and Small, 2000) and 
applied to the NHS. The context of the study means the findings are not directly 
applicable to the NHS, for example, legal immunity is given to reporters of incidents 
in these industries which could potentially reduce barriers to reporting, and this 
does not occur in the NHS. See table 1 for an overview of further studies (Author, 
2009). 
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Table 1: Summary of empirical research on barriers to incident reporting 2000-
2006 (Source: Author, 2009)  
 
Author 
(Date) 
Methodology Main Findings Critique 
Barach 
and 
Small 
 (2000) 
Literature 
search 
Questionnaire 
Lack of understanding of 
what a near miss is and what 
should be reported.  Fewer 
barriers identified than in 
other studies. 
The study was based on literature from non-
medical environments, the finding are valuable 
however they are not absolutely applicable to the 
NHS. The author applied the results of the 
literature to the NHS; however it failed to take 
account of the different cultures which exist in 
different organizations and impact on incident 
reporting. Legal immunity is given to reporters of 
incidents therefore producing fewer barriers. 
 
Lawton 
and 
Parker  
(2002) 
 
Literature 
search  
Questionnaire 
 
A culture of fear in the 
medical profession 
discourages incident  
reporting  
Doctors were unwilling to 
report a colleague as its 
seen as ‘whistle blowing’  
The study was important in identifying the 
differences in reporting between the doctors and 
nurses, however, it takes no account of other 
professional groups within the NHS. The study 
relies on self-reporting and there are limitations 
with this approach as respondents may be 
tempted to select the socially desirable 
response. Results are therefore hypothetical and 
of limited value. 
 
Firth-
Cozens  
(2003) 
Questionnaire 
 
Fear of retribution The study refers to incident reporting in the 
same way as whistle- blowing, however, the 
term whistle- blowing has a negative connotation 
and may be responsible for the low response 
rate reported. The low response rate, although it 
does not invalidate the findings it makes it more 
difficult to confirm conclusions.  
 
Jeffe et 
al  
(2004) 
Literature 
search  
Interviews in a 
focus group  
Qualitative 
 
 
Not knowing what to report 
Not knowing how to report 
Fear of  repercussions and 
lack of confidentiality 
Time and reporting efficiency 
Lack of feedback are all 
barriers to reporting 
This is a balanced study which covers a wider 
cross-section of the medical profession. 
However, it does not look at the professions 
which support medicine such as pathology, 
radiology and pharmacy. The nursing profession 
is overrepresented and the qualitative nature of 
the study, suggest that it might not be applicable 
at other hospitals. Some of the managers may 
not be clinically based which suggests that some 
responses are theoretical and not representative 
of how nurses would react in reality.  
 
Coyle 
(2005) 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Lack of time was found to be 
the major barrier to incident 
reporting, the extra work and 
concern about career and 
personal reputation and the 
excess paper work involved 
in reporting 
This study reflects the views of staff from 
ambulatory care, and therefore may not be 
totally applicable to the hospital setting. However 
it confirms the findings of Jeffe et al (2004). 
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Table 1: Continued 
Author  
(Date) 
Methodology Main Findings Critique 
 
Evans 
(2006) 
Questionnaire 
 
Lack of feedback, the incident form 
taking too long to complete and the 
belief that an incident was too trivial to 
report. 
The study also showed that near 
misses and forgetting to report 
incidents because staff were too busy 
were important factors in not reporting 
incidents.  
A quarter of respondents did not know 
how to access an incident form or what 
to do with them. 
This study adds value to the 
subject because it confirms 
previous findings and adds a new 
dimension, by identifying 
organisational barriers to incident 
reporting. The Organisational 
factors relating to structure and 
process such as inadequate 
feedback, long forms and 
insufficient time to report were 
found to be barriers to incident 
reporting.  This study pinpoints 
specific areas which managers 
can focus on and change to 
improve the process of reporting.  
Again this study only focuses on 
doctors and nurses, however it did 
confirm that doctors have the 
greatest barrier to incident 
reporting, thus giving managers a 
more focused approach to this 
subject (as this was also found by 
(Lawton,2002 and Uribe, 2002).  
 
Schectman 
(2006) 
Questionnaire 
 
Low proportions of doctors reported 
incidents for fear of being blamed. 
 Other barriers include reason 
already stated above, additional 
reason included fear of legal 
ramifications. This study was 
carried out in the USA therefore 
legal issues may not be as 
significant in the NHS as doctors 
would be covered by NHSLA and 
are unlikely to suffer personal 
financial loss.   
The study included junior doctors 
yet made no allowance for 
variables such as experience or 
training some doctors only had 
one year’s experience. In this 
study 49% of doctors were not 
familiar with the reporting process. 
This study should have prompted 
a follow-up study of in-depth 
interview to ascertain the reasons 
why such a low result was found. 
Professional cultural issues could 
be a cause of non-reporting. 
 
 
Several categories of barriers to incident reporting have emerged from the 
literature analysis: 
• Cultural barriers to incident reporting 
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• Organisational barriers to incident reporting 
• Barriers to incident reporting as a result of fear 
• Barriers to organisational learning from incidents 
 
2.9 Cultural Barriers to Incident Reporting 
 
 Organisational culture is central to incident reporting, from ensuring that incidents 
are identified and reported through to embedding corrective action into practice 
(DH, 2000). A lack of trust in the organisational culture can also be a strong 
disincentive to reporting incidents (Westrum, 1992).  A number of studies all carried 
out in a healthcare environment have found that a culture of silence is the norm 
within the NHS (Firth-Cozens, 2004; Warburton, 2005, Kaldjian, 2006). Conversely, 
Evans (2006) and Uribe (2002) did not find that cultural issues such as fear to be a 
major reporting obstacle.  
 
Another cultural issue identified in NHS studies was the ‘culture of blame’. It was 
found to be a noteworthy barrier to incident reporting (Waring, 2005). This finding 
was supported by the principal findings of another qualitative study carried out in 
an NHS hospital (Wilson, 2007). This particular research went further by 
concluding that the culture of medicine itself was a significant barrier to reporting 
(Wilson, 2007). This is because when things go wrong, the response of managers 
has often been an attempt to identify an individual who must carry the blame (DH, 
2000). Raising concerns is therefore perceived by some individuals as a high-risk, 
low- benefit act (Attree, 2007). The DH acknowledged in a policy document (An 
organisation with a memory, 2000) “that the blame culture of the NHS had 
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contributed to the lack of understanding of medical errors” (DH, 2000). There is a 
movement in the NHS toward considering errors from a perspective of root cause 
analysis (Parker and Lawton, 2003) instead of blame. Also the NPSA has been 
trying to introduce an open and fair culture in hospitals (Parker and Lawton, 2003) 
to improve the level of incident reporting. 
 
Another large study carried by Lawton and Parker (2002), found a culture of fear in 
the medical profession which discourages incident reporting.  Doctors were 
unwilling to report a colleague as it was seen as ‘whistle blowing’, which was a 
cultural taboo (Lawton and Parker 2002). 
 
A variety of different studies found low proportions of doctors reported incidents for 
fear of being blamed (Schectman, 2006) and of being ostracised (Firth-Cozens et 
al, 2003, Kingston et al, 2004). These findings support earlier work which identified 
that the medical profession had a ‘closed culture’ which inhibits openness (DH, 
2000, Kennedy, 2001).Only a small percentage of doctors formally report incidents 
(Evans, 2006),(Cowan, 2004) (Lawton and Parker,2002), (Uribe, 2002). 
 
Recent UK health policy initiatives promote a ‘no blame culture’ (Ehrich, 2006) in 
order to encourage incident reporting. However, there is evidence that healthcare 
staff have been disciplined for speaking about incidents with their peers 
(Richardson, 2002). According to the Healthcare Commission for England, a 
culture of blame still stops healthcare professionals from reporting patient safety 
incidents (Hitchen, 2007). This is a contentious point because individuals must 
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sometimes be held to account for their actions, if there is evidence of gross 
negligence or recklessness, or of criminal behaviour (DH, 2000). Some hospitals 
have adopted a ‘fair blame culture’, however, this can send out mixed messages if 
managers do not specify clearly what incidents could lead to disciplinary action. 
Lawton and Parker (2002) found that reporting is constrained by the specific 
occupational hierarchies in the NHS. The use of the cultural web model (figure 10), 
identifies some of the cultural aspects of the organisation which both supports and 
inhibits incident reporting. 
  
The cultural web model (Johnson and Scholes, 2006) allows analysis of different 
areas of organisational culture. The concept of the cultural web is a representation 
of the taken-for-granted assumptions (paradigm) of an organisation and the 
behavioural manifestations of a culture (Johnson and Scholes, 2006).  Figure 10 
outlines the elements of the cultural web which need to be considered in order to 
understand the culture of an organisation: 
• The routine and rituals of the web represents “the way we do things around 
here”. 
• The stories represent the way members of an organisation tell each other 
what’s important in the organisation. 
• Symbols represent the nature of the organisation, the symbol may reveal an 
underlying assumption about customers (or patients) which might play a 
significant role in influencing the strategy of an organisation (Johnson and 
Scholes, 2006).   
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• Power structures are likely to influence the key assumptions of the 
organisation; however, there are different sources of power within most 
organisations. 
• The control systems emphasise what is important to monitor in an 
organisation. 
• Organisational structure is likely to reflect power and show important roles 
and relationships. 
• The paradigm of the organisation encapsulates and reinforces the 
behaviours observed in the other elements of the cultural web. 
 
The model encourages those applying it to identify specific issues within the web; 
there is an assumption that any area of the web can be changed. It provides a 
static view of an organisation and offers no forward projection. Analysis is not 
objective because it can be influenced by any preconceived notions that an 
individual already hold about the culture of NHS before the model is applied 
(Author, 2009). Rituals, routine stories and symbols lie at the heart of culture 
Schein, (2004) and therefore cannot be easily changed. The symbols may be 
routes to manipulating culture; nonetheless, organisational cultural shifts are 
difficult to accomplish (Roth, 2004) and can take between 5-10 years. 
Another assumption made is that the structure of the web refers to the formal 
structure of an organisation. However, it does not represent the informal structures 
present within organisations and any subcultures, it is therefore unitary. This is 
significant because subcultures allow the NHS to be viewed in a pluralistic manner 
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(Collins,1998), which means that there is no absolute view, and highlight the point 
that everyone’s views will be different even within the same professional group or 
department.  
The outer sections of the web whilst providing a support  and protective system for 
the paradigms can also create cultural ‘lock in’ because they create ‘barriers’ which 
could effectively deflect external signals which could potentially encourage new 
ways of improving incident reporting (Author, 2009).  
 
 
 
2.10 Organisational Barriers to Incident Reporting 
According to Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) (cited in Milligan, 2007: page 100) 
“organisational culture and policies are important variables related to organisational climate”. 
Organisational climate embraces a wide range of factors, such as its structure, 
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Figure 11: Cultural web (Source:  Johnson and Scholes, 2006)   
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communication chains and lines of responsibility. Hospitals are large organisations 
which consist of many subsections; therefore the hierarchical structure is the most 
effective way to manage. However, this structure acts as a filter for information 
which results in loss of information at each level of the structure. Information can 
become filtered to the extent that frontline and backroom staff are unaware of what 
to or how to report incidents. Junior managers can become unaware of overarching 
strategies and so learning only occurs at a local level. 
Time-consuming reporting mechanisms in health care have been identified as an 
important barrier to incident reporting in the UK and Australia (Firth-Cozens 2002, 
Kingston et al. 2004). Organisational factors relating to structure and process such 
as inadequate feedback, long forms and insufficient time to report were found to be 
barriers to incident reporting in the NHS (Evans, 2005 and  2006), (Uribe, 2002), 
(Coyle, 2005). Evans (2006) in a large cross sectional survey of doctors and 
nurses (n= 1062) found that a quarter of respondents did not know how to access 
an incident form or what to do with them once completed. It is interesting that 
doctors viewed organisational barriers to be more significant in preventing them 
from reporting incidents than cultural issues, such as fear or blame (Evans, 2006). 
This study pinpoints specific areas which managers can focus on and change to 
improve the process of reporting. Indeed, the DH has been trying to influence 
patient safety at this level, with the inclusion of patient safety as the number one 
domain in the Health Standards (2004).  
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2.11 Barriers to Incident Reporting as a result of Fear 
Fear has been reported as a barrier to reporting errors in the NHS (Vincent et al, 
1999) “Fear of retribution” was also reported by Firth-Cozens (2003). According to 
another study “low proportions of doctors reported incidents for fear of being 
blamed” (Schectman, 2006). This study was carried out in the USA where legal 
ramification may have more impact than they do for NHS doctors. Although NHS 
doctors are covered by NHSLA and are unlikely to suffer personal financial loss, 
they are however, at risk of losing their job if unsupported by the GMC. 
    
2.12 Barriers to organisational learning and the learning 
organisation  
 
 
Organisational learning defined by Dixon (1994) (cited in Beardwell et al 2004, 
page 329): 
“The intentional use of learning processes at the individual, group and system level to 
continuously transform the organisation in a direction that is increasingly satisfying to its 
stakeholders”. 
Organisational learning has also been described as a social phenomenon; as 
individual learning depends on the knowledge which others in the organisation 
possess (Figueiredo, 2003 cited by Curado, 2006).Organisational learning is 
therefore a process of individual and collective learning, both internally and 
externally of the organisation (Prange, 1999). However, Ikehara (1999) suggests 
that individual learning does not necessarily lead to organisational learning. 
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There are various models of organisational learning proposed (Argyris, 1995). 
These include Single-loop learning, which involves reacting to a problem based on 
pre-set organisational standards (usually documented in policies). According to 
Argyris and Schon (cited by Brooks, 1999) most organisations are locked into 
single-loop learning. Double-loop learning is referred to as higher-level learning 
(Fiol and Lyles, 1985) cited in Lynn (2004). Such learning occurs when the 
organisation is willing to question long-held assumptions about pre-set standards 
(Argyris, 1995, Iles & Cranfield, 2004). 
The NHS falls short of being a learning organisation because; there is too often a 
‘blame’ culture, no account is taken of near misses and there is little culture of self-
appraisal. Figure 12 the learning step was produced by DH (2000) and identifies a 
number of key steps to learning from incidents. The NHS will have to become a 
learning organisation in order to achieve these. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Key steps in learning from adverse events (Source: DH, 2000) 
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Writers such as Senge (2006) and Pedler et al (1997) put forward the concept of 
the learning organisation. Pedler et al (1997) cited in Beardwell et al, (2004, page 
329) defines a learning organisation as “an organisation that facilitates the learning of all 
its members and consciously transforms itself and its context”. This suggests that it is a 
vision of what might be possible when organisations go beyond merely training 
individuals towards developing learning at the whole organisation level (Beardwell 
et al, 2004).    
A learning organisation is one in which people continually expand their capacity to 
create the results they truly desire and learn how to learn and perform well together 
(Senge, 2006).He suggests that organisational learning can be analysed using the 
fifth discipline: systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, building shared 
vision and team learning. 
Senge’s personal mastery looks at the connection between organisational learning 
and personal learning. There is an assumption that personal learning will lead to 
organisational learning, but this will not happen if the individual does not share their 
learning.  
Mental models on the other hand are difficult to share and analyse because they 
are so deep-seated and everyone will have their own views. Building a shared 
vision is an idealistic view and is rarely found in large organisations. This is 
dependent on the effectiveness of management in ensuring that policies are 
disseminated. Team learning will depend on the sharing of knowledge ie feedback 
mechanisms. 
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Systems thinking assumes that each of the many departments within the NHS are 
aware of what’s going on in other departments. It also assumes an appropriate 
level of communication between departments so that managers are informed of the 
outcome of incidents and any associated learning. The author agrees that there 
are interrelations between departments, but feel that interaction tends only to occur 
at times of crisis perhaps learning from near misses does not occur.  
Finally this model is oversimplified and static; it makes many assumptions which 
cannot be applied to all organisations equally. It is prescriptive and offers no 
feedback mechanisms from which to learn (Nonaka, 1991) cited in Beardwell et al, 
2004. 
Iles and Sutherland (2001) completed a review of literature on learning 
organisations and identified five key characteristics that are valuable in terms of 
how organisations can managed and  promote effective learning ( table 2). This 
model is interesting because it includes leadership which is important in setting the 
vision for the organisation. 
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Structure Learning Organisations have flat managerial hierarchies that enhance 
opportunities for employee involvement in the organisation. These 
features promote systems thinking, information sharing and openness to 
information necessary for organisational learning.  
Information 
Systems 
Learning Organisations require information beyond that used in traditional 
organisations where information is generally used for control purposes 
(single-loop learning). Transformational change requires more 
sophisticated information systems that facilitate rapid acquisition, 
processing and sharing of rich, complex information that enables effective 
knowledge management. 
 
Human 
Resource 
practices 
People are recognised as the creators and users of organisational 
learning. Accordingly, human resource management focuses on provision 
and support of individual learning. Appraisal and reward systems are 
concerned to measure long-term performance and to promote the 
acquisition and sharing of new skills and knowledge. 
 
Organisational 
culture 
Learning Organisations have strong cultures that promote openness, 
creativity and experimentation among members. They encourage 
members to acquire process and share information, to nurture innovation 
and provide the freedom to learn from mistakes. 
 
Leadership Like most interventions aimed at securing significant organisational 
change, organisational learning depends heavily on effective leadership. 
Leaders model the openness, risk taking and reflection necessary for 
learning and communicate a compelling vision of the Learning 
Organisation, providing empathy, support and personal advocacy needed 
to lead others towards it. 
 
Table 2: How organisations can promote learning (Source: Iles and Sutherland, 
2001) 
Learning from incidents is critical to NHS organisations and their staff in delivering 
a safe and effective service to patients (WHO, 2005). Research on learning from 
failures in health care is relatively sparse (DH, 2000).However, a recent small scale 
NHS study concluded that there is potential for organisational learning to result 
from individual learning (Cooper, 2005).  This is interesting because most 
organisational learning models are focused on the activities of individuals of 
organisation, which results in “individual action bias” (Huysman, 1999).  
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2.13 Developing a Conceptual Framework 
An important outcome of the literature review is the development of a conceptual 
model. A conceptual model is a diagram that connects variables /constructs based 
on theory and logic to display visually the hypotheses that will be tested (Hair, 
2007). A number of models have been incorporated into the conceptual framework.   
Appendix F list the models identified as appropriate for examining the research 
objectives outlined in chapter one (page10).   
There are limitations associated with each of the different models considered in 
this Chapter. However, the models selected provide the researcher with a clearly 
defined starting point with which to undertake investigations into the underlying 
issues related to incident reporting and associated barriers. Figure 14 highlights 
the areas of investigation that the research will focus on.  
Figure 14: The three principal areas of investigation 
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The conceptual framework supports the investigation in the following ways:  
1. The modification of the E-V-R model (illustrated by the oversize ‘Value’ 
section) emphasises the fact that the value of the organisation is the 
overarching factor in determining any barriers to incident reporting.  
2. Embedding the cultural web model in the centre of the value section, helps 
to highlight the reasons for specific cultural issues such as blame or open 
cultures which shape the value of an organisation (objective 2). 
3. Within the ‘Value’ section, the elements of Senge’s fifth discipline (2006) 
signify the important issues for learning from incidents (objective 2). 
4. The organisation does not operate independently of its external environment 
therefore the STEEPLE model is embedded into the ‘Environment’ section 
of the model. This section will partly answer questions relating to objective 
one.  
5. Barriers identified in the literature (objective 1) will help to focus attention on 
barriers to incident reporting at The Christie (objective 2). 
6. The ‘Resource’ section of the model includes a SWOT analysis which 
focuses on human resource systems and incident reporting systems in order 
to answer objective 3.  
Chapter three will consider the different approaches to research and identify the 
most suitable methods to investigate the barriers to incident reporting against the 
developed conceptual framework in figure 15. 
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Figure15: Conceptual Framework for investigating 
barriers to incident reporting  
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review (chapter 2) depicts a range of models which are available to 
investigate barriers to incident reporting in the NHS leading to a conceptual 
framework. The application of the conceptual framework within a research setting 
requires an understanding of research philosophy and methodology, so that the 
most appropriate methods is applied to the research question in order to provide 
reliable and credible results. This study was supported by the Risk Manager and 
the Director of Clinical Governance and therefore did not require a full application 
to the Clinical Research and Clinical Governance Committee. 
3.2 Research Paradigm and Philosophy 
The term ‘paradigm’ describes the progress of scientific discoveries in practice, 
rather than how they are subsequently reconstructed in books (Easterby-Smith et 
al, 2004).  
There are three major ways of thinking about research philosophy: epistemology, 
ontology and axiology -see table 3 for a definition of each.  
Epistemology General set of assumptions about the best ways of 
inquiring into the nature of the world. 
Ontology Assumptions that we make about the nature of reality 
 
Axiology Studies judgements about value 
 
 Table 3: Overview of the major ways of thinking about research philosophy (Source: 
Saunders and Lewis, 2007) 
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Understanding philosophical issues is useful for three reasons (Easterby-Smith et 
al, 2004):  
1. Because it can help to clarify research designs 
2. To recognise which design will work or not work 
3. To help the researcher identify and create designs outside of their past 
experience. 
A balanced view of the different philosophical positions is important because 
research problems may require a compromise design which draws from more than 
one tradition (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004). There are three philosophical positions 
which predominate in management research; these are positivism, social 
constructionism and realism. Figure 16 shows the continuum of ontological 
assumptions, developed by Morgan and Smircich (1980) which demonstrates a 
number of approaches along the continuum of philosophical paradigms.    
 
            
             
 
 
Figure16: Continuum of ontological assumptions (Source: Morgan and Smircich, 
1980) 
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Saunders et al (2007) describes the research process as an ‘onion’. The model 
(figure 17) illustrates the various components of research design.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: The Research Process ‘onion’   (Source: Saunders et al, 2007) 
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their own beliefs and values. There is an assumption that the researcher is 
independent of and unaffected by the subject of the research (Remenyi et al, 1998) 
cited in Saunders et al, (2007).  
Positivist research has a structured methodology and can be easily replicated (Gill 
and Johnson, 2002) cited in Saunders et al, (2007).   An advantage of this 
philosophy is that it would be easier for researchers to prove that they were 
objective and that their own values did not influence the research. Heron (1996) 
cited in (Saunders et al, 2007) suggest the use of personal value statements in 
relation to the area of study; can also support objectivity. There are a further two 
assumptions with this philosophy: Firstly, an ontological assumption, that reality is 
external and objective and secondly, an epistemological assumption, that 
knowledge is only significant if based on observations of external reality (Easterby-
Smith et al, 2004). The elements of positivist philosophy are summarised in table 4. 
 Positivism 
 
Social Constructionism 
The observer Must be independent Is part of what is being 
observed 
Human interests Should be irrelevant Are the main drivers of 
science 
Explanation Must demonstrate 
causality 
Aim to increase general 
understanding of the 
situation 
Research progresses 
through 
Hypotheses and 
deduction 
Gathering rich data from 
which ideas are induced 
Concepts Need to be operational 
so they can be 
measured 
Should incorporate 
stakeholder perspectives 
Units of analysis Should be reduced to 
simplest terms 
May include the 
complexity of ‘whole’ 
situations 
Generalization through Statistical probability Theoretical abstraction 
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Sampling requires Large numbers selected 
randomly 
Small numbers of cases 
chosen for specific reasons 
Table 4: Comparison of positivism and social constructionism (Easterby- Smith et al, 2004)  
3.4 Social Constructionism 
Social constructionism is also referred to as “interpretive” methods.  ‘Reality’ is 
determined by people rather than by external factors (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004). 
This view takes into account the different meanings that people place on their 
experience. Easterby-Smith et al, (2004) compares social constructionism 
philosophy with that of positivism (table 4). According to Saunders et al, (2007) 
there are advantages and disadvantages relating to both social constructionism 
and positivism (table 5). 
 Positivism Social Constructionism  
Advantages 
1. Economical collection of large 
amounts of data. 
2. Clear theoretical focus for the 
research from the outset. 
3. Greater opportunity for researcher to 
retain control of the research 
process. 
4. Easily comparable data. 
1. Facilitates understanding of how and 
why. 
2. Enables researcher to be alive to 
changes, which occur during the 
research process. 
3. Good at understanding social 
processes. 
Disadvantages 
1. Inflexible, direction often cannot be 
changed once data collection has 
begun. 
2. Weak at understanding social 
processes. 
3. Often doesn’t discover the meanings 
people attach to social phenomena. 
1. Data collection can be time 
consuming. 
2. Data analysis is difficult. 
3. Researcher has to live with the 
uncertainty that clear patterns may 
not emerge. 
4. Generally perceived as less credible 
by non –researchers. 
 
Table 5: Advantages and disadvantages of positivism and social constructionism 
(source: Saunders et al, 2007) 
 
3.5 Realism 
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The “realism” philosophical viewpoint is based on the assumption that what the 
senses show us is reality and that objects have an existence independent of the 
human mind (Saunders et al, 2007).  
There are two types of realism, direct and critical realism. Direct realism states that 
“what you see is what you get” (Saunders et al, 2007 page 105). However, according 
to Bhaskar (1989) “what we see is only part of the bigger picture” (page 105). Critical 
realism argues that “what we experience are sensations, the images of the real world, not 
the things in the real world, not the things directly” (Saunders et al, 2007 page 105). 
Therefore different observers may have different viewpoints.  
The direct realist perspective suggests the world is relatively unchanging and 
operates only at one level in an organisation (Saunders et al, 2007). In contrast 
critical realists consider that the world operates at multiple-levels within an 
organisation (Saunders et al, 2007).   
Realism is therefore more concerned with exposing and identifying what reality is 
as opposed to discovering it (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004. Table 6 represents the 
three philosophical views discussed and corresponding methodological 
implications. 
Social Science Epistemologies 
 Positivism Realism Social 
Constructionism 
Elements of Methods                                             
Aims Discovery Exposure Invention 
Starting points Hypotheses Supposition
s 
Meanings 
Designs Experiment Triangulatio Reflexivity 
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n 
Techniques Measurement Survey Conversation 
Analysis/interpretati
on 
Verification/falsificati
on 
Probability Sense-making 
Outcomes Causality Correlation Understanding 
 
Table 6: Methodological implications of different epistemologies within social 
science (source: Easterby-Smith et al, 2004) 
DePoy and Gitlin (2005) propose that the selection of a research tradition and 
design strategy is based on three considerations:  
1. The purpose of conducting the research 
2. The way in which you reason about a phenomenon 
3. The level of knowledge development in the area to be investigated 
 
3.6 Philosophical Position 
 
The criteria for selecting research philosophy were based on the following: 
• The principal objective of this research is to investigate any barriers to 
incident reporting, which may exist at The Christie NHS Foundation Trust, 
using the conceptual framework developed in chapter 2 (figure 14). 
• It has been clearly recognised from the literature review that barriers to 
incident reporting exist, although the body of literature is limited.  It is not 
clear if any of the barriers identified in the literature exist at The Christie 
NHS Foundation Trust. Therefore the starting position of this research is to 
reveal new understanding, a position that is associated with a social 
constructionist approach to the research design. 
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• The level of knowledge on barriers to incident reporting is not well defined 
and therefore rules out a positivist approach to the research. 
• The value the organisation holds is a dominant factor in the conceptual 
framework and is therefore a significant element of the research.  In order to 
understand what individuals within the organisation see as important it is 
vital to converse with them. This technique is also associated with social 
constructionism.  To gain wide cross-section of views a survey technique is 
also utilised which supports a realist approach.   
Overall the combination of social constructionism and realism approach is most 
suitable for this research design because the researcher has to interpret 
opinions on the issue of barriers to incident reporting. 
3.7 Research Approach 
The approach to research stems from the philosophical viewpoint taken by the 
researcher. As shown by the research ‘onion’ (figure 16) the research approach 
can be either deductive or inductive.  
The deductive approach is research involving the testing of a theoretical 
proposition by the employment of a research strategy specifically designed for the 
purpose of its testing (Saunders, et al, 2007). According to Robson (2002) cited by 
Saunders et al, (2007, page 117) there are five stages through which deductive 
research will progress: 
1. Deducing a hypothesis 
2. Expressing the hypothesis in operational teams 
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3. Testing the operational hypothesis 
4. Examining the specific outcome of the inquiry 
5. Modifying the theory in the light of the findings 
This approach is useful for explaining relationships between variables. It is 
primarily used for the collection of quantitative data and would require a highly 
structured methodology to facilitate replication (Gill and Johnson, 2002) cited in 
Saunders (2007). This approach stems from a positivist perspective and is 
therefore not applicable to this study; nonetheless, the deductive approach 
requires the formulation of a hypothesis. This was not the approach used in this 
research, as objectives were developed before the research was started as 
opposed to using a developed hypothesis. It is not unusual to combine deductive 
and inductive approaches in research. As suggested by Creswell (1994) cited in 
Saunders (2007), the approach taken will be dependent on the research topic. 
Table 7 shows the main differences between each approach. 
 
Deduction emphasises Induction emphasises 
Scientific principles Gaining an understanding of the 
meanings humans attach to events 
Moving from theory to data A close understanding of the research 
context 
The need to explain causal relationships 
between variable 
The collection of qualitative data  
The collection of quantitative data A more flexible structure to permit 
changes of research emphasis as the 
research progress  
The application of control to ensure 
validity of data 
A realisation that the researcher is part 
of the research process  
63 
 
The operationalisation of concepts to 
ensure clarity of definition 
Less concern with the need to 
generalise 
A highly structured approach  
Researcher independence of what is 
being researched 
 
The necessity to select samples of 
sufficient size in order to generalize 
conclusions 
 
 
Table 7: differences between deductive and inductive approach (Source: Saunders 
et al, 2007) 
An inductive approach is research involving the development of a theory as a result 
of the observation of empirical data (Saunders et al, 2007). This approach is 
appropriate to be used with small numbers, researchers are likely to work with 
qualitative data and use a variety of methods to collect this in order to identify 
differing views (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004). An inductive approach was applied in 
this research, with some elements of a deductive approach; figure 18 gives an 
overview of the approach taken.  
The inductive and deductive approaches are shown along the continuum because 
the research does not fit neatly into one category. An inductive approach would 
mean that there was no initial hypothesis, which is the case in this research. 
However, there are previous theories identified in the literature review which were 
utilised in developing the objectives. Therefore, the approach used would include 
some elements of a deductive approach, whilst embracing elements from the 
inductive approach.  
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           Figure  
Figure18: Continuum of ontological assumptions including the research approach utilised 
(Source: Author, 2009) 
 
3.8 Research Strategy 
It has already been established that a combination of social constructionism with a 
tendency toward realism will be used (figure 18).  
There are various research strategies which can be used as shown below:  Some 
are suited to deductive and others are more suited to an inductive approach, 
however, they are not mutually exclusive. 
• Experiment- this type of research strategy involves the use of theoretical 
hypothesis, the selection of known samples and the control of all variables, 
this approach is not applicable to this study and therefore will not be used.  
• Survey- is often associated with the deductive approach (Saunders, et al, 
2007). It is obtained using questionnaires which are used to collect data or 
opinions. Data collected by this process may be slow to collate, and there 
are limitations on the types of questions which can be explored.  
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• Case study- a strategy usually used in explanatory or exploratory research. 
Yin (2003), cited in Saunders, (2007) argues that multiple case studies are 
preferable to a single case study, as a single study would require strong 
justification. This approach is not used because it would not yield the depth 
of coverage required to address the research objectives, but a single case 
study is used. 
• Action research- this strategy is concerned with the resolution of 
organisational issues involving the members of the organisation. The 
researcher is part of the organisation and not a consultant (Coghlan and 
Brannick, 2005). Work by Schein (1999), cited in Saunders, (2007) 
emphasises the importance of employee involvement throughout the 
research. An action research strategy combines both data gathering and 
facilitation of change. This approach is applicable to this research, because 
theories were developed from the findings of the questionnaire, which were 
later investigated via the use of semi-structured interviews (Appendix H). 
• Grounded theory- According to Goulding (2002) this strategy is useful for 
predicting and explaining behaviour. Theory is developed from data 
generated by a series of observation and is suited to an inductive approach. 
This approach is applicable to this research. However, as a participant 
observer it is not practical to directly observe a cross-section of staff and 
maintain my position as the blood transfusion manager. Also my presence 
could create a bias towards reporting incidents and therefore reduce 
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understanding on the issue of barriers to incident reporting. This is known as 
the ‘Hawthorne effect’ cited in Gill and Johnson (2005, page 60).  
• Archival research- this strategy makes use of administrative records and 
documentation. This approach is applicable for this research but will not be 
used because of the time constraints. The strategies used in the research 
are show in red (figure 19).  
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Figure19: Matrix of research philosophies and designs (source: Easterby-Smith et 
al, 2004) 
 
3.9 Choices 
 
Multi-methods can be used which is the use of more than one data collection and 
analysis procedure to answer the research question (Saunders et al, 2007). 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) cited in Saunders et al, (2007) refer to this method 
as research design. 
 
The research was conducted in three stages: 
1. Survey of a cross-section of staff working at The Christie. This includes staff 
of various grades and clinical groups. The questionnaire findings will be 
used to form a structured template to support the semi-structured interviews. 
2. Semi-structured interviews with relevant staff, which includes; Risk 
Manager, Quality Manager and the Clinical Governance Director. Any 
evidence of organisational barriers to incident reporting was discussed at 
interview.   
3. Search and review the literature and carryout an analysis of secondary data 
(National Staff Survey, 2008) this will be explained later.  
 
A mixed method is a general term for when both quantitative and qualitative 
data collection techniques and analysis procedures are used in the research 
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design (Saunders et al, 2007). This research used a multi method approach. 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) cited in Saunders et al, (2007) argue that 
multiple methods allow a better understanding of research questions and 
therefore findings can be trusted. There are two advantages of using multiple 
methods:  
• Different methods can be used for different purposes in a study. 
• Mixing methods enables triangulation to take place. 
 
 
 
3.10 Time horizons 
This research was a cross-sectional study. A cross-sectional study often employs 
the survey strategy (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004) and gives a ‘snapshot’ of the 
organisation. However longitudinal research is valuable because it has the capacity 
to study change and development. It was suggested by Adam and Schvaneveldt 
(1991) cited in Saunders et al, (2007) that by observing people in this way the 
researcher is able to provide a measure of control. However, this was not used as 
it is difficult for the researcher to be objective and would be limited by the time 
constraints (Saunders et al, 2007). 
 
3.11 Quantitative and Qualitative Data 
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Primary data collection methods can be divided into two types- qualitative and 
quantitative (Hair, 2007).Table 8 shows the distinctions between quantitative and 
qualitative data.  
               Quantitative data                                                                                              Qualitative data 
Based on meanings derived from 
numbers 
Based on meanings expressed through 
words 
Collection results in numerical and 
standardized data 
Collection results in non-standardised 
data requiring classification into 
categories  
Analysis conducted through the use of 
diagrams and statistics 
Analysis conducted through the use of 
conceptulisation 
 
Table 8: distinctions between quantitative and qualitative data (Source: Dey (1993); 
Healey and Rawlinson (1994) cited in Saunders et al, 2007) 
 
Quantitative data collection involves gathering numerical data using structured 
questionnaires or observation guides to collect primary data from individuals (Hair, 
2007). Quantitative data collection is also referred to as survey research, and is the 
best approach when large samples are used. This research uses qualitative data in 
the main, however, quantitative methods are used to analyse the data, but under 
these circumstances it is a matter of collating opinions and not facts. 
A self-completion survey is one of the methods employed in this research. This 
approach collects data using structured questionnaires. A structured questionnaire 
is a predetermined set of questions designed to capture data from respondents 
(Hair, 2007). It is a scientifically developed instrument for measuring key 
characteristics of individuals (Hair, 2007). 
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A questionnaire consists of a standard set of questions with limited answers. The 
wording of the questionnaire is important to obtain accurate data.  Questionnaires 
can be delivered in several ways, see table 9 for the advantages and 
disadvantages of different modes of administration. 
Methods  of 
Administrations 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Questionnaires issued by post 
 
Wider access  
and better coverage 
Questionnaires must be simple 
 Provides anonymity Low response rate 
 Relatively low cost Points of clarification are not 
possible 
 Large sample size Follow-up of nonresponse is 
difficult  
 Respondents complete 
questionnaire at own pace 
 
Questionnaires issued in person Establish empathy and 
interest  
Expensive in time and cost 
 Can probe complex issues May lead to interviewer bias 
 Clarify respondents’ queries Difficult to obtain wide access 
 High response rate Relatively small sample size 
Questionnaires issued 
electronically 
 
Easy to administer Loss of anonymity 
 Glob reach Complex to design and 
program 
 Fast data collection and 
analysis 
Limited to computer users 
 No interviewer bias  
 
Researchers using questionnaires make the assumption that respondents have the 
knowledge and motivation to complete the questionnaire. The disadvantages of 
using questionnaires are the potential for bias and the poor response rate, 
however, the data is amenable to statistical analysis. 
The self-completion questionnaire was designed following a review of the literature, 
to investigate the elements of the conceptual framework (appendix F). The 
questionnaire consisted predominantly of closed scaled questions. Closed 
Table 9 Advantages and disadvantages of methods of administering survey questionnaires 
(source: Hair, 2007)  
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questions reduce the time it takes to complete the questionnaire, and so may lead 
to an improved response rate. Closed questions may lead the respondent to select 
a response which is on the pro-forma, but does not allow them to articulate the 
ways they understand the matter of interest (Gill and Johnson, 2005). It is usually 
for these reasons that surveys alone are considered low in validity (Gill and 
Johnson, 2005). 
Some questions also provided an opportunity for additional comments to be 
included which adds to the validity. In contrast to closed questions, an open 
question allows the respondent to use their own words potentially allowing for a 
fuller and richer response. However, open questions can be difficult and time 
consuming to interpret. 
The Likert scale was used for some questions, which allowed the respondent to 
express the extent to which the respondent agreed or disagreed with an opinion 
expressed. The aim was to determine the respondents’ attitude towards the subject 
under scrutiny.  However, there are individuals who will answer questions in a 
manner that they feel to be socially desirable rather than their true feelings.  
There are also the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ responder who always answer yes or no 
respectively, despite the structure of the question. It is difficult to control for this 
kind of bias.  
Once the questionnaire was developed it was tested in a small pilot study. It is 
important to allow time for the construction, revision and refinement of a 
questionnaire (Oppenheim, 1999).The study group included: the Risk Manager, 
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Quality manager, Haematology Service Manager, Clinical Audit Manager, 
Pharmacy Manager, a medic, and three nurses (band 5,6 band 7). Overall the pilot 
group was skewed by the number of managers; however the author felt that it was 
important to ensure that managers were happy that meaningful questions were 
being addressed and so avoid producing any spurious negative or positive results.  
Nursing staff form the largest group of employees within the trust, and therefore it 
was important to check that the wording of the questions was not ambiguous 
particularly to this group of staff. A number of minor changes were made to the 
questionnaire following discussion with members of the pilot group. The changes 
made are outlined in (Appendix J).  
The questionnaire and covering letter are attached as appendix G. The covering 
letter sent with the questionnaire informed recipients of the nature of the research. 
The questionnaire was developed by incorporating issues which had been 
identified in the literature review as being potential barriers to reporting incidents. 
The questionnaire was divided into five sections:  
• Section 1 determined the demographics of the participants. 
• Section 2 assessed understanding of the incident reporting system. 
 Question 7 requested that slips, trips and falls were not included. This was 
because the finding of a large multicentre research carried out by Shaw et al 
(2005: page 282), identified that slips, trips and falls accounted for 41% of the 
incidents reported in the study. The number of these incidents increased with 
the patient’s age. For patients over sixty the number was 47% and for the over 
seventy the majority of reports were of this type. Over 95% of the patients at 
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The Christie would fit into this age range and because there does not appear to 
be any underreporting of slips, trips and falls (NRLS, 2008) so this group of 
incidents was not included, to prevent the findings from being skewed.   
• Section 3 assessed any barriers to incident reporting. These questions 
were developed based on findings in the following research (Barach and 
Small, 2000, Parker and Lawton, 2003, Waring, 2004, Firth-Cozens, 
2004, Jeffe et al, 2004, Coyle, 2005, Evans et al, 2006, Schectman, et 
al, 2006). 
• Section 4 assessed learning from incidents and the culture (the 
following references were helpful in formulating questions: (Cooper, 
2005 and Shaw, 2004).  
• Section 5 gave the respondent the opportunity to add any further 
comments. 
 
Sampling techniques 
Sampling techniques provide a range of methods that enables a reduction in the 
amount of data which needs to be collect by considering only data from a subgroup 
rather than all possible cases (Saunders et al, 2007). The full set of cases from 
which a sample is taken is called the population. Sampling provides a valid 
alternative to a census.   
There are two sampling techniques, probability and non- probability. Probability 
sampling was applied to this research and is associated with survey-based 
research strategies; however this is not suitable for populations of less than fifty 
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cases (Henry, 1990 cited in Saunders et al, 2007). There are four stages to the 
process of probability sampling: 
1. Identify a suitable sampling frame based on the objectives. 
2. Decide on the sample size. Stutely (2003) suggests that a minimum sample 
of 30 is required to provide statistical analyses. 
3. Select sampling technique. 
4. The sample should be representative of the population. 
 
 A total of 210 staff within the Trust received a questionnaire from a total population 
of 1000; a limit was placed on sample size because of the time constraints. 
However, the researcher was happy that this number would allow the collection of 
a broad range of views from those who work within the trust. The degree of 
precision (sampling error) is said to be plus-or-minus 6.5% for a sample size of 200 
(Oppenheim, 1999). 
The questionnaires were issued randomly within specific areas of the Trust to 
include all clinical specialities. This was achieved by issuing ten questionnaires to 
managers per location. These were distributed amongst the staff, 160 completed 
questionnaires were returned; representing a return rate of 76%. This was 
significantly higher than expected. This was the result of an intranet campaign to 
encourage staff to respond and management pressure. Management pressure on 
staff may have resulted in staff providing socially accepted responses when 
completing the questionnaire. 
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The questionnaire findings were followed up in interviews with senior managers. 
The interview questions were structured based on the results of the questionnaires 
(Appendix G).This allowed the researcher to check whether there was agreement 
with the conclusions from the findings. It was possible to explore the issues 
associated with barriers to incident reporting in more details with a small number of 
senior individuals whose remit would be to consider suggested recommendations 
and to support implementation of new strategies. 
Qualitative data refers to all non-numeric data or data that have not been quantified 
(Saunders, 2007). Theoretical knowledge is generated from qualitative studies that 
ask theory-generating questions and is not generated from quantitative studies that 
insert a set of uniform questions that limit findings to insights (Morse, 2001). 
However, Glaser (1992) warns that the researcher must be true to what is 
presented in the data (cited in Morse, 2001), to avoid researcher bias.  
There are two approaches to qualitative data collection, which are observation and 
interviews. Observation is not an appropriate method for achieving the objectives 
as the observational process itself would directly influence the way that staff react 
to an incident. However, if staff were unaware of their participation in the research 
then it could be argued that this method of data collection was unobtrusive and 
therefore advantageous avoiding any bias. This would be difficult to achieve in a 
clinical situation and would violate research participant’s rights. Another 
disadvantage of observation is there is no opportunity to observe any unseen 
thoughts or attitudes. Nonetheless the use of interviews would allow the researcher 
to understand why barriers to incident reporting occur.  
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3.12 Interviews 
Interviews may be used in both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Bell (1993) 
indentified three types of interviews: structured, semi-structured and unstructured. 
Semi-structured Interviews allow the researcher to exercise their own initiative in 
following up an interviewee’s answer to a question. This approach may result in 
unexpected and insightful information coming to light. A semi-structured interview 
has an overall structure and direction, but allows a lot of flexibility to include 
unstructured questioning. The disadvantages of semi-structured interviews are that 
there may be a tendency for the focus of the interview to be lost or that too much 
time is spent on one particular area (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004). The best-known 
semi-structured interview approach is the focus group (Hair, 2007). This approach 
was not used in this research, because of the time constraints. Semi-structured 
interviews were carried out on a one to one basis with senior managers. Ten days 
prior to the interviews senior managers were asked to complete a blank copy of a 
SWOT, STEEPLE, Cultural web and EVR models, and these models were all 
discussed during the interview. The semi-structured interview questions (Appendix 
H) ranged from closed to open questions.  
 
Interview methods are direct and flexible as questions can be either open-ended or 
closed. Closed questions are difficult to construct but easy to analyse. The 
researcher needs only to tabulate the number of responses to each alternative to 
gain some understanding about what the sample as a whole thinks about an issue. 
Nevertheless the analysis of open-ended questions is difficult and time consuming 
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because the researcher needs to develop categories for the assignment of 
responses. This method creates the potential for researcher bias involved in the 
categorisation process, particularly with ambiguous responses. 
A major drawback to closed questions lies in the possibility of the researcher 
overlooking some possible responses to questions. This may lead to an 
inadequate understanding of the issue or an outright bias if the respondents 
choose an alternative that misrepresents their position. Pre-testing of the interview 
schedule may overcome this. 
Closed questions can be considered to be superficial, whilst open-ended questions 
offer a richer and fuller perspective on the research question if the respondents are 
co-operative (DePoy, 2005). The richness may be lost following tabulation; 
however, the incorporation of excerpts may reduce this.   
The researcher repeated answers to ensure clarity and prevent misinterpretation of 
responses. The same questions were posed to each interviewee, in the same 
order. 
The main weakness of interview method is the influence of the researcher as the 
interviewer. The quality of the data collected will depend on the proficiency of the 
interviewer. It is important that the interviewer does not lead the respondent and 
that neutral, non-directive questioning is used (DePoy, 2005). 
Gill and Johnson (2005: page 149) developed a fourfold categorisation (figure 20) 
of the role that a participant observer can take: complete participant; complete 
observer; observer as participant and participant as observer.  
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Figure 20: The participant observation role of the researcher shown in red (Source: 
Gill and Johnson, 2005) 
Participant as observer role the researcher and the subjects are aware of the fact 
that it is a fieldwork relationship (Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992) cited in Saunders, 
2007. Delbridge and Kirkpatrick (1994) cited in Saunders, 2007, categorise the 
types of data generated by participant observation as ‘primary’, ‘secondary’ and 
‘experiential’ (table 10). Participant observation is good at explaining ‘what is going 
on’ in particular situations and virtually all data collected are useful. However, it can 
be time consuming and poses ethical dilemmas for the researcher (Saunders et al, 
2007). 
Data generated How participant  
observation was 
achieved in this 
research 
Primary observations The researcher notes 
what happened or what 
was said. 
Interview 
Secondary observations Observers interpret what 
was said.  
Analysis of questionnaires 
and interviews. 
Participant 
observation 
Overt 
research 
Spectator 
Covert   
researc
Complete 
participant 
Participant 
-as - 
Observer -
as- 
participant 
Complete 
observer 
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Experiential data Perceptions and feelings 
as research progress. 
 Research Log 
 
Table 10: Type of data generated using participant observation (source: adapted 
Saunders et al, 2007) 
 
Participant observation is high in ecological validity because it involves studying 
social phenomena in the natural contexts (Saunders et al, 2007). 
The role of the participant observer in this research was to understand why some 
incidents are not reported and to establish what can realistically be done to 
improve the level of incident reporting at The Christie. 
 
3.13 Data Collection 
Data can be collected by one or more of the following: interviews, observation and 
questionnaires (see figure 21) for the various approaches to data collection used in 
this research. This is a critical stage of the research, if not enough consideration is 
given to this stage then it could be too late to correct the deficiencies after data has 
been collected. 
  
 
 
            
 
 
Primary Data 
Secondary Data 
External- National Staff Survey 2008 and 
literature   from books and journals 
Data Collection 
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Figure 21: Data Collection Methods used during this research (Source: adapted 
from Hair, 2007)  
 
Data used for research that was not gathered directly and purposefully for the 
project under consideration are termed secondary data (Hair, 2007). There are 
advantages associated with the use of secondary data, which include: saving time, 
effort and expense (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005) cited in Saunders et al, 2007. 
However, consideration must be given to the fact that the original data may not 
have been collected with the current research question in mind (Denscombe, 1998) 
cited by Saunders et al, 2007. However, the theoretical approach and research 
methodologies may be similar. 
The NHS Staff Survey (2008) was conducted by the Healthcare Commission in 
October 2008 and published in March 2009. The data was used as a quantitative 
method for data collection and was managed by The Picker Institute. The survey 
results for The Christie were used for comparison with the primary research 
findings. The survey is not specifically designed to investigate barriers to incident 
reporting, however, aspects of the survey relate closely to the elements of the 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Interviews 
Semi 
structured  
Observati
on 
Human 
Self- Completion 
Survey 
Direct with intranet/     
e-mail reminders 
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conceptual framework under investigation. The 2008 survey provides information 
on the attitudes and experiences of staff in Acute NHS Foundation Trust and is 
designed to help improve working conditions and practices in healthcare services 
and therefore the quality of care provided to patients. Any statements or results 
referring to the National staff survey will be preceded by ‘NSS’ (National staff 
survey).  
Specific areas of the survey that are useful for analysis include: 
• Errors, near misses and incidents (HCC, 2009 page 16) 
• Fairness and effectiveness of procedures for reporting errors, near misses 
or incidents (HCC,2009 page 50) 
• Whistle blowing and confidentiality (HCC, 2009 page 48) 
• Types of training, learning and development (HCC,2009 page 45) 
 
 
As previously stated, this research employs research methods which include the 
use of questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, secondary data and document 
review in order to validate the data which strengthen the validity and reliability of 
findings. The research methodology bridge (Moran, 2008), (figure 22) shows how 
the various methods have been used to achieve triangulation. The text in red 
represents the disadvantage of a method and green text is the advantages of the 
method. 
 
                                                                      Questionnaires     
Semi-structured Interviews 
Closed 
questions 
Poor response No control over 
respondents 
Easy to analyse    Easy to 
administer 
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Figure 22: Metaphorical Bridge towards Triangulation (source: Moran, 2008 
adapted by Author, 2009) 
 
A systematic review of the literature examined many studies that have been 
conducted to gain insight into barriers to incident reporting in hospitals. Employing 
a formal search that used Emerald, Medline, and Proquest, by keywords included: 
incidents, human errors, near miss, risk, safety, quality, patient safety and barriers 
to incident reporting. Seven studies were eligible for inclusion. Journals used 
included: Quality and Safety, Nursing Times, Health Care Risk Report, Nursing 
Standard, British Medical Journal, Quality and Safety in Health Care and Joint 
Commission Journal on Quality. References of each citation were reviewed to 
identify additional descriptions of barriers to incident reporting in the NHS.Relevant 
books were used throughout the research; however, books were predominantly 
useful for Chapter three. 
 
3.14 Reliability 
 
              Triangulation achieved              
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Reliability refers to the consistency of the results obtained in research (Gill and 
Johnson, 2005). According to Easterby-Smith et al, (2004, page 135) reliability is 
“primarily a matter of stability. The use of multi method approaches (as used in this 
research) “optimises the reliability and validity” (Gill and Johnson, 2005 page 200). 
The term “reliability” also refers to the consistency and repeatability of results 
achieved by separate researchers working on the same topic, working 
independently, and getting the same or nearly the same results. However, 
reliability will be viewed differently and depends on the philosophical viewpoint of 
the researcher (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004). Table11 highlights the perspectives 
held by the different traditions.  
 Positivist Relativist Constructionist 
Reliability Will the measures 
yield the same 
results on other 
occasion? 
Will similar 
observations be 
reached by other 
observers? 
Is there 
transparency in 
how sense was 
made of the raw 
data? 
Table 11:  Perspectives on Reliability (Source: Easterby-Smith et al, 2004) 
The reliability of the primary research is justified by the use of a questionnaire 
which was developed based on the findings of a literature review and findings from 
many other researches investigating the issue of barriers to incident reporting. 
Similarly, during the semi-structured interviews, the researcher conducted each 
interview in the same manner and followed the structured template (Appendix H). 
The interviewer also repeated answers to clarify meaning and therefore avoid any 
errors of interpretation. 
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The secondary data was collected by only selecting data that had a direct link to 
the research questions. 
3.15 Validity 
Saunders et al (2007, page 614) define validity in two ways: 
1. The extent to which data collection methods accurately measure what they 
intend to measure. 
2. The extent to which research findings are really about what they profess to 
be about. 
It is recognised that this research will only have internal validity to The Christie and 
cannot be used to generalise about other NHS hospitals, because as it is a single 
case study. 
There is no explicit way to measure validity, however, according to Patchen, (1965) 
cited in Easterby-Smith et al, (2004) there are a number of ways to estimate it 
(table 12). 
  
Construct validity   
     
Extent to which your measurement 
questions actually measures the 
presence of those constructs you 
intended them to measure. 
Criterion validity Ability of a statistical test to make 
accurate prediction 
 
Ecological validity A type of external validity referring to 
the extent to which findings can be 
generalized from one group to 
another. 
Not 
applicable to 
this research 
Not- 
achieved by 
Yes- this is 
achieved by 
this research 
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Internal validity Extent to which findings can be 
attributed to interventions rather than 
any flaws in your research design. 
Measurement validity The extent to which a scale or 
measuring instrument measures 
what it is intended to measure. 
 
Table12:  Estimation of Validity (Source: Saunders et al, 2007 adapted by Author, 
2009) 
Once again the philosophical viewpoint taken by the researcher will determine the 
understanding of validity as shown in table 13. The validity of this research is 
robust and this is demonstrated by the triangulation process. 
 
 Positivist Relativist Constructionist 
Validity Do the measures 
correspond closely to 
reality? 
Have a sufficient 
number of 
perspectives been 
included? 
Does the study 
clearly gain access 
to the experiences 
of those in the 
research setting? 
 
Table 13: Perspectives on validity (Source: Easterby-Smith et al, 2004) 
 
 
 
3.16 Triangulation 
 
Triangulation is also referred to as crystallisation (Maxwell, 2004); it is a basic 
aspect of data gathering that also shapes the action process of data analysis 
(DePoy and Gitlin, 2005).  In triangulation, one source of information is checked 
Yes- 
applicable to 
this research 
questionnaire 
Yes- 
achieved by 
this research 
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against other types of sources to determine the accuracy of hypothetical 
understanding and to develop complexity of understanding. Figure 22 (page 81) 
shows how multiple approaches bear on the same phenomenon thereby 
preventing ‘gaps’ in analysis. Triangulation enables the researcher to validate a 
particular finding by examining whether different sources provide convergent 
information. This technique increases the accuracy of information gathering 
(Bluebond- Langner, (1978) cited in (DePoy and Gitlin, 2005). This research is well 
triangulated. 
 
 
3.17 Cross Mapping Matrix 
Cross mapping matrix (table 14) is used to ensure congruence between the 
following three aspects:  
• The conceptual framework 
• The objectives 
• Individual research methods 
Key: Research Objectives and Research Methods 
 
QA=Questionnaire 
SSI= Semi-Structured 
Interview 
SD = Secondary Data 
  Objective 1                    Objective 2              Objective 3 
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Elements of the 
Conceptual 
Framework 
To identify the 
general issues which 
influence clinical 
incident reporting in 
the NHS, through a 
literature review. 
 
To identify barriers 
to incident 
reporting at The 
Christie and assess 
the culture of 
learning from 
incidents 
 
To assess the range of 
strategic/operational 
choices available to 
reduce identified barriers 
to incident reporting, to 
examine the factors 
affecting implementation 
of strategic/operational 
choice, draw conclusions 
and make 
recommendations 
 
QA           SSI              
SD 
QA            SSI        
SD 
QA             SSI                   
SD 
Culture 
                           
NA            NA             
SD     
Q10p13   SSI QC.1       
SD 
Q14 
Q15         SSI QC.2     
Q22             
Q22 
           SSI QC.3                 NA 
Learning NA            NA             
SD        
Q11           SSI QL.1      
SD 
Q12           SSI QL.2   
Q13             
Q16               
Q17 
Q19 
Q21 
Q10p2            SSI QL.3                 
NA 
Resources 
 
NA              NA          
SD       
Q4             SSI QR.1     
SD  
Q5             SSI QS.7                                                            
Q6 
Q8 
Q10p2             SSI QR.2              
Q10p 4 -7      SSI QR.3               
SD 
STEEPLE 
 
NA             SSI QS.9        
SD       
NA              NA             
NA 
NA               SSI QS.3                  
SD 
Barriers to 
reporting 
 
NA            SSI QS6      
SD      
Q10p1-15    SSI QS.1     
SD  
          SSI QS.2 
                    SSI QS.3  
          SSI QS.4 
                    SSI QS.5      
Q21p1-9         SSI QS.8               
SD 
Table 14: Cross Mapping Matrix (source: Author, 2009) 
Chapter 4 
RESEARCH FINDINGS & ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter presents the findings from the selected research methods discussed 
in chapter 3. The findings will be structured and presented by research method and 
the elements of the conceptual framework (table 14), using the following headings: 
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 Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
 Semi-structured Interview Results 
 Secondary Data 
 Element of Conceptual Framework 
 Commentary in relation to the objectives and  literature review 
 
4.1 Demographic Profile of staff completing Self-completion Questionnaires 
Q1. What band are you? 
 
Of the 160 respondents, 16 % were band 4 or below , 38 % band 5 , 18 % band 6 , 
13% band 7, band 3% 8a , above band 8a and 13% . The professional group the 
respondent belonged to is shown in table 15. The number of years that the 
respondents had worked for the organisation is shown in figure 23.  
 
 
Q2. To which of the following staff groups do you belong?  
 
Staff group 
n =160 
Staff group % 
Medical 8 
Nursing  70 
89 
 
AHP 17 
Students (Nursing and AHP) 5 
 
Table 15:  Professional group of respondents 
 
Q3. How long have you worked for the Trust? 
 
 
Figure 23: The length of service of respondents at The Christie 
 
4.2 Demographic Profile of staff completing the NHS National Staff Survey 
(NSS) 
A total of 800 staff from The Christie were issued with a NSS.  440 staff at The 
Christie responded in the NNS survey. This is a response rate of 57% which is 
above average for acute specialist trusts in England (HCC, 2009) .See table 16, 
82% 
18% 
n= 
90 
 
demographic profile of respondents and table 17 for the respondents’ occupational 
groups.  
Table 16: Demographic characteristics of respondents (source: HHC, 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17: The occupational groups of respondents (source: HHC, 2009) 
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4.3 Demographic Profile of staff taking part in the Semi-Structured Interview 
(primary data, n= 3) 
Quality Manager 
Risk Manager 
Director of Nursing and Clinical Governance 
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4.4 Commentary on the demographic profile of respondents 
67% of respondents participating in the primary research were between bands 4-6 
and this group represents the frontline staff. The majority of respondents were from 
a nursing profession (70% primary data). 74% of the NSS data respondents were 
female. The medical profession is poorly represented in both primary and NSS 
data (8% and 3% respectively). The allied health professionals are represented in 
primary data (17%) and NSS data (30% which includes scientific staff). The 
literature review revealed few studies relating to this professional group and 
therefore these findings are of interest, adding a new dimension to the literature on 
barriers to incident reporting in an NHS hospital. 
The self- completion questionnaire revealed that 82% of the staff have worked at 
The Christie for more than one year, which means they have sufficient work 
experience to be able to comment on this topic. 
4.5 Objective 1- main findings 
To identify the general issues which influence clinical incident reporting in the NHS, 
through a literature review. 
The main findings relating to this objective are outlined in the literature review table 
1 (page 35).Several categories of barriers to incident reporting have emerged from 
the literature analysis: 
• Cultural barriers to incident reporting 
• Organisational barriers to incident reporting 
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• Barriers to incident reporting as a result of fear 
• Barriers to organisational learning from incidents 
4.6 Semi-Structured Interview Results 
The respondents (n=3) were asked to consider this model (STEEPLE) and 
complete before the interview. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: STEEPLE analysis identifying the main drivers for incident reporting 
(Source: Author, Risk Manager, Quality Manager and Clinical Governance 
Director, 2009) 
 
 
The 
Christie 
NHS 
Foundatio
n Trust 
Environmental 
Not applicable 
to the research 
question 
Political 
Foundation Trust 
NHS as an emerging 
market- impact on 
Legal 
MHRA 
NPSA 
Corporate 
Manslaughter Bill 
NHS Redress Act 2006 
Medico-legal  
Ethical 
Codes of 
conduct and 
accountability 
Professional 
standards 
Economical 
Payment by 
results 
National tariff 
Technological 
Changing 
technology 
(Chemo 
systems) 
Connecting for 
Socio-Cultural 
Ageing population, 
people living longer 
with cancer 
DH (2007) 
establishment of 
cancer networked 
treatment centres 
 Increased public 
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Commentary on STEEPLE analysis 
STEEPLE analysis identified the following: 
All interviewees agreed that staff were bound by codes of conducts and 
professional standards to report incidents. They all agreed that reporting is 
therefore mandatory but it was also agreed that “reporting was something that 
managers could not enforce and that it was down to the individual to comply with their 
professional standards”. 
NPSA have set standards on the level of incident reporting by which NHS trust 
should aim to comply. Legal frameworks such as the NHS Redress Act (2006), 
require patients to be informed when an incident involving them occur. This could 
potentially increase the number of litigation cases which occur. 
“If patient safety incidents are not managed this could impact on the reputation of the trust 
and potentially impact on patient’s choice”. “This could decrease the revenue from payment 
by results, which could impact on the availability of funds to be spent on new technology”. 
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The respondents (n=3) were also asked to consider this model (E-V-R) and 
complete before the interview.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
          
Figure 25: E-V-R congruence (Source: Thompson, (2001) adapted by Author and 
Director of Nursing and Clinical Governance) 
 
Commentary on EVR model 
The EVR model identified the need for a web based reporting system. 
Resources  
The trust has planned to 
introduce an electronic system 
for incident reporting in May 2009 
which would allow congruence. 
Resources are currently 
insufficient in key areas eg there 
is only a paper based, incident 
reporting system which takes a 
long time to complete.  
Environment  
Changes are slow and 
implementation is slower, therefore 
strategic drift could happen over 
time. 
If regulatory agents or an EU 
directive increase the level of 
reporting expected from the Trust. 
The organisation would find it 
difficult to respond as it is not fully 
 
 
 
The value is  
‘We care… we 
discover…we teach’ 
 
The Trust values should 
include some assurance on 
safety, which could help to 
improve the patient safety 
culture. Staff would then see 
that this message was being 
driven by the leaders of the 
A paper based system 
makes reporting more 
difficult because the IRF 
takes a long time to 
complete. A web 
based system would 
make reporting easier 
for staff with access to a 
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 “There are plans to introduce a web based reporting in May 2009”. “There are some areas of 
the trust that do not have access to computers and some groups of staff that would need 
computer training”. 
 
4.8 Objective 2- main findings 
To identify barriers to incident reporting at The Christie and assess the culture of 
learning from incidents. 
4.9 Self-completion Questionnaire (n=160) (Appendix G): Results  
Q6. Do you feel confident about completing an incident report form? 
Q7. In your time at this Trust, have you completed an incident report form (please 
do NOT include falls)? 
Q8. Do you know what constitutes a reportable incident? 
 
Figure 26: The Christie System knowledge 
n= 
160 
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Q9. How would you define an incident? 
The currently accepted definition of a patient safety incident is “any unintended or 
unexpected incident which could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients 
receiving NHS care” (NPSA, 2008).  The definitions by staff varied depending on 
the professional groups. 
Of the 13 medics taking part only 9 supplied a definition of an incident. From the 9 
definitions there were only 2 which came close to the NPSA definition. 
• “An event (actual or near- miss) that may result in personal injury to a member of staff 
or patients”  
• “Anything that could cause harm to a patient or a member of staff” 
 
Other comments supplied which did not fit the standard definition included:  
• “An adverse event” 
• “An event that may give rise to injury, dissatisfaction or loss” 
 
Of the 112 nursing staff surveyed (primary data) 91 said that they knew what constitutes 
an incident, however the responses reveal some issues of understanding with only 20% of 
definitions being close to the standard NPSA definition. 
• “Something that is serious that needs reporting and maybe investigated eg patient fall” 
 
• “A patient being physically aggressive or given wrong information or medication” 
 
• “Any incident that has an actual or possible detrimental effect on patient or staff” 
 
98 
 
•  “An untoward event resulting in breakdown of routine procedures that may damage or 
present a risk to patients, staff, services, facilities or finance” 
 
Only 10% of the allied health professionals defined incidents in general terms as 
shown below.  
• “An event which has resulted in injury or near injury to a patient staff or an event which 
could significantly compromise patient  care” 
• “An event which occurs and has adverse repercussions for patents or staff” 
Allied health professionals tended to report incidents in terms of their specific area 
of work. 
• “A circumstance whereby an error has resulted in negative implications for staff or 
service users. An example may include erroneous results being released” 
• “Something that has caused harm or the potential to cause harm which could be due to 
procedures not being followed or something in which an individual did not know 
about” 
The students did not supply many definitions of an incident; the two received are 
shown below: 
“An incident is when an error done by one party can affect another party outside of the area 
that the incident was created” 
“Anything adverse to normal functioning of a hospital” 
The risk manager agreed that the “risk team could provide workshop training at ward 
level”, while the Director of Nursing and Clinical Governance agreed that “Incident 
reporting should become part of the mandatory training programme”. 
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Commentary on the understanding of the incident reporting process 
89% of respondents said that they felt confident about completing an IRF 
(appendix I). However, 22% of the respondents say they have never completed an 
IRF. Interestingly, 94% of respondents say that they know what constitutes an 
incident. However, when respondents were asked to define an incident there was 
some confusion and respondent only defined an incident in terms of their areas of 
work. This indicates a lack of general understanding with regards to incident 
reporting. Interviewees agreed that there may be “a lack of clarity about what to report” 
this is a barrier that was also identified by Jeffe et al (2004). Interviewees agreed 
that training at local level would be beneficial. 
The risk manager agreed that the “risk team could provide workshop training at ward and 
departmental level”   
The Director of Nursing and Clinical Governance agreed that “Incident reporting 
should become part of the annual mandatory training programme”   This would be a way of 
ensuring an update of training for all staff. 
 NSS (Q19d) indicates that the trust is below the national average for training. This 
is an area which will need to be addressed. 
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Self-completion Questionnaires Barriers to incident reporting 
Q10. Would any of the following prohibit you from completing an incident form? 
 
Table 18:  The results of those members of staff that agree with the comments 
 
Commentary on barriers to incident reporting identified  
 
Nurses 
The data on barriers to reporting revealed significant variations in the attitude to 
incident reporting within the different staff groups of the hospital. 21% of nurses 
indicated that the form takes too long to complete and interrupts the work, a finding 
 
Overall sample size 
                           (N= 160) 
Nursing 
staff 
(n=112) 
Doctors  
(n= 13) 
AHP 
(n=27) 
Student 
(n=7) 
1.Lack of confidentiality/anonymity 20% 0% 19% 0% 
2.Too busy 46% 23% 44% 36% 
3.Fear of repercussion  16% 8% 19% 13% 
4.Fear of disciplinary action 13% 8% 22% 0% 
5.Fear of litigation  15% 8% 19% 0% 
6.Labelling & blame for raising concerns 22% 8% 30% 13% 
7.Pointless, nothing will be done about it 25% 8% 30% 0% 
8.Fear of career and personal reputation at 
stake 
13% 8% 19% 0% 
9.Lack of clarity about what to report 21% 23% 30% 38% 
10.Difficulty reporting a more senior member 
of staff 
27% 38% 26% 38% 
11.Never get any feedback on action taken 40% 15% 26% 13% 
12.Reporting interrupts the work process   21% 15% 30% 0% 
13.A culture of silence is the norm 10% 8% 11% 25% 
14.Everyone makes errors 26% 15% 30% 63% 
15.Form takes too long to complete 21% 15% 30% 0% 
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supported by Coyle (2005). 46% of nurses said they were too busy to report 
incidents this was also a significant finding on barriers to incident reporting made 
by Coyle (2005), Evans (2006) and Jeffe et al, (2004). If the length of the form was 
reduced this could save time and remove a barrier. 40% of nurses agree that not 
getting feedback was a significant barrier to reporting, a finding which supports 
research carried out by Evans (2006) and Jeffe et al, (2004). 
Interestingly, 25% of nurses think it’s pointless to report incidents because nothing 
would be done about it. Yet 51% to nurses also reported that changes occurred as 
a result of incident reporting, there is clearly some contradiction here and this could 
just be an issue of differing perceptions. 
Overall the level of incident reporting is highest amongst nursing staff a finding 
which supports previous work by (Lawton, 2002, and Schectman, 2006). Lawton 
(2002) study was important in identifying the differences in reporting between the 
doctors and nurses. 
Doctors 
“The level of reporting amongst doctors is low” 
38% of doctors said they had difficulty reporting a more senior member of staff, this 
also reflects findings from other studies. Only a small percentage of doctors 
formally report incidents (Evans, 2006), (Lawton, 2002), (Uribe, 2002). The low 
number of responses from the medics may also reflect an attitude to reporting, 
according to Bolsin et al, (2005) the professional culture of medicine has not 
always recognised the need to report adverse events.  
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Two prominent and interrelated themes can be proposed as influencing medical 
attitudes to participation in incident reporting: 
 1) 38% of doctors said they have difficulty reporting a more senior doctor and 
 2) 15% of doctors say they never get feedback on action taken following incidents. 
This is supported by the response to the question, which asked how feedback on 
incident reporting was given. 54% of doctors responded ‘no’ indicating that they 
never get any feedback on incidents. It follows that if few doctors report incidents 
then there will be little to feedback on. However, 23% of doctors said they received 
feedback from a manager and 15% received feedback via e-mail. This method of 
feedback is surprising as managers have no way of ensuring that the e-mail was 
read and understood by the intended party. 
Students  
Findings indicate that 63% of students believe that everyone makes mistakes and 
therefore feel empowered to report incidents. This is supported by Firth-Cozens 
(2004), who demonstrated that student nurses were more open in reporting their 
own mistakes. 25% of students felt that a culture of silence was the norm; this was 
challenged by the Risk Manager who stated that “a lot of time had been spent on this 
group and that this finding was a surprise” it was also felt that this was not supported by 
the National staff survey (HCC, 2009).  A comment made by several students at 
the end of the self-completion questionnaire was that “senior staff reported errors made 
by student but did not report their own mistakes”. This group of staff also found it difficult 
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reporting a more senior member of staff (38%). A lack of clarity and being too busy 
was also cited as barriers to reporting (38%) respectively. 
AHP-group 
44% of AHP felt that being too busy was a barrier to reporting. All interviewees 
were in agreement that this was an “excuse and that staff had 24 hours in which to report 
an incident”. However, the NSS data supports the view that staff feel that they are 
too busy (HCC, 2009).    
Reducing the length of the form would reduce the barrier, however all interviewees 
agreed that there was a minimum amount of data required for an investigation to 
take place so the form could only be slightly reduced. 30% of AHP said there was a 
lack of clarity about what to report. “The forms could also be modified to give clear 
indication about what constitutes an incident”.  Interviewee agreed that “this information 
could be made available on the trust intranet”. 
Within the AHP group Pharmacy and Pathology operate their own independent 
error logging system. This was a source of some confusion as staff were not 
always clear when an error should be reported as a trust incident and when to 
complete an IRF.  This is therefore an organisational barrier to incident reporting. 
The Risk Manager was not happy with this arrangement because “both systems 
operated in parallel and there was little evidence of information transfer, putting the trust at 
risk.”   
30% of AHP fear blame and 30% thought it was pointless reporting as nothing 
would be done about it. A lack of feedback and reporting more senior staff is also a 
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barrier for this group of staff (26% respectively). 22% of AHP fear disciplinary 
action being taken this was the highest across the groups. “This was probably the 
result of disciplinary action being taken in the past, the culture is now changing”. 
 
 
Table 19:  The results of those members of staff that disagree with the comments 
 
It is interesting that doctors disagreed most strongly of all groups with most 
categories of barriers to reporting. The lowest result 54% indicate that doctors 
considers this most important. This is further supported by the fact that 38% 
doctors have said that they would have difficulty reporting a more senior doctor. 
 
Overall sample size 
                           (N= 160) 
Nursing 
Staff 
(n=113) 
Doctors 
(n=13) 
AHP 
(n=27) 
Student 
(n=7) 
1.Lack of confidentiality/anonymity 71% 100% 63% 88% 
2.Too busy 50% 77% 52% 63% 
3.Fear of repercussion  78% 85% 56% 8% 
4.Fear of disciplinary action 81% 85% 52% 88% 
5.Fear of litigation  74% 69% 44% 88% 
6.Labelling & blame for raising concerns 69% 77% 56% 63% 
7.Pointless, nothing will be done about it 62% 92% 56% 88% 
8.Fear of career and personal reputation at 
stake 
74% 77% 52% 88% 
9.Lack of clarity about what to report 68% 69% 56% 50% 
10.Difficulty reporting a more senior member 
of staff 
65% 54% 59% 50% 
11.Never get any feedback on action taken 47% 62% 52% 63% 
12.Reporting interrupts the work process   72% 85% 67% 100% 
13.A culture of silence is the norm 81% 84% 70% 63% 
14.Everyone makes errors 61% 85% 63% 38% 
15.Form takes too long to complete 70% 69% 56% 75% 
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Interviewees agreed that fear of disruption to career progression could be a barrier 
for some staff.  
 “It would not be unreasonable to assume that fear would be an important factor in not 
reporting a more senior doctor”. Indeed fear was a major factor identified in the 
literature (Lawton, 2002, Firth-Cozen, 2003, Jeffe et al, 2004, Coyle, 2005, 
Schectman, 2006). 
Table 20 shows the overall ranking of the top five barriers to incident reporting at 
The Christie NHS Foundation Trust. It is interesting that “being too busy” is ranked 
highest by all groups, yet this is the only barrier that senior management do not 
accept as being a ‘real’ barrier to incident reporting. Table 21 shows the five 
barriers ranked by professional groups. 
 
 
 
 
Table 20: Top five barriers listed by all professional groups 
 
 
 
                                   Five top barriers identified 
1.  Too busy 
2.  Lack of clarity about what to report 
3.  Difficulty reporting a more senior member of staff 
4.  Never get any feedback on action taken 
5.  Form takes too long to complete 
106 
 
 
Table 21: Top three barriers ranked by each professional group 
 
Q14. Would you feel comfortable reporting an error made by someone else? 
 
Figure 27: Reporting an error made by someone else 
 
 
 
Overall sample size 
                           (N= 160) 
Nursing 
staff 
(n=112) 
Doctors  
(n= 13) 
AHP 
(n=27) 
Student 
(n=7) 
1. Too busy 1 3   
2. Never get any feedback on action taken 2  1  
3.  Difficulty reporting a more senior member 
of staff 
3 1  2 
4. Lack of clarity about what to report  2 3 3 
5. Everyone makes errors    1 
6.Labelling & blame for raising concerns   2  
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Q.15 Do you view whistle blowing and incident reporting as the same? 
 
Figure 28: Whistle blowing and incident reporting 
Commentary on reporting errors made by others 
34% of respondents would not feel comfortable reporting an error made by 
someone else. 17% of respondents viewed whistle blowing and incident reporting 
in the same way. The negative connotation associated with whistle blowing could 
act as a barrier for this group, senior managers agreed that: 
“There is always room for improvement in the reporting culture” 
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4.10 Secondary Data Results on incident reporting at The Christie 
NSS- KF 21. Percentage of staff witnessing potentially harmful errors, near misses 
or incidents in last month (n=440)  
Commentary on NSS results  
NSS data indicates that, 38% of staff at the trust had witnessed at least one error, 
near miss or incident which could have hurt staff, patients or service users. The 
trust's score of 38% was in the highest (worst) 20% of acute specialist trusts in 
England (HCC, 2009). This ranking has not changed significantly since the 2007 
survey, when the trust also scored 38%. This finding indicates that staff are 
observing incidents but not reporting them. This finding coupled with the NPSA 
(2008) findings on the level of incident reporting, supports the view that there are 
barriers to incident reporting at The Christie NHS Foundation Trust. 
 
According to the national staff survey (Q23g) staff are provided with feedback 
following incidents. Q23f staff also indicated that they are informed about incidents. 
It would appear that some staff respond differently to the same question depending 
on who is asking the question. 
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4.11 Culture- Self-completion Questionnaires Results 
Q22. In your view which of the following best describes this organisation’s culture? 
 
 
 
Figure 29: The culture of The Christie  
Commentary on the culture of incident reporting at The Christie 
 
77% of staff considers the culture at The Christie to be ‘no blame’ or ‘fair blame’, 
however, 14% of staff considers the trust to have a ‘blame culture’ and therefore 
this is a barrier to reporting for a small group of staff. Interviewees agreed that 14% 
was a small number and that this possibly represented those staff for which 
disciplinary action had to be taken. 
4.13 Semi-Structured Interview Results 
SSI-QC.1 How would you describe the culture at The Christie in relation to incident 
reporting? 
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“There is a good culture of incident reporting, over the last 8 years it’s become a cultural 
norm” 
All managers interviewed agreed that the culture of incident reporting was good 
and felt that there was a good level of awareness among the majority of staff with 
regard to incident reporting and its importance. However, all interviewees 
expressed the view that staff had a tendency to only report serious incidents and 
would not necessarily report near misses or observed incidents involving other 
members of staff. The Director of Nursing and Clinical Governance felt that:  
“There is always room for improvement in the reporting culture” 
SSI-QC.2 37% of respondents do not feel comfortable reporting an incident made 
by someone else, how might this be addressed?  
Most respondents feel that it was everyone’s responsibility to report incidents, this 
could remove ownership, what do you feel? - would it be better to reduce confusion 
by saying it is the responsibility of the individual involved in the incident to report it? 
The Quality Managers views follow, which summarised the views of all 
interviewees (n=3).   
“There is a particular problem for junior doctors and students, as reporting a senior member of 
staff whom would be responsible for developing your career and writing a reference would be 
madness. I can see how that would create a barrier for junior doctors” 
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Interviewees felt that this was an area that would be difficult to address and that 
this was an issue for the Medical Director. Due to the time constraints the 
researcher was unable to make an appointment with the Medical Director to 
discuss this issue. All interviewees (n=3) agreed that this issue relates to 
leadership because it was about attitudes to reporting and not the reporting system 
itself. 
“Medical staff need to have confidence in the reporting system, there needs to be a change in 
attitude amongst medics, who feel that reporting incidents is below them” 
SSI-QC.3 13% of respondents view incident reporting and whistle blowing in the 
same way, can you comment on this? 
When questioned about this issue it emerged that there was inappropriate use of 
the incident reporting system and that it had been used to “name and shame”. It was 
agreed by all managers that there was a negative connotation associated with 
whistle blowing and that some staff felt that the incident reporting was the same as 
whistle blowing and therefore did not report incidents. 
“When staff becomes frustrated they use the incident reporting system to whistle blow, this 
may be where the link came from” 
When interviewees were asked what practical things could be done to prevent this, 
the following suggestions were made:  
• “There needs to be feedback so that staff are challenged about inappropriate use” 
• “Introduce  ‘gatekeepers’ named  people who can technically validate incidents, and 
therefore weed out inappropriate incidents” 
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SSI-QC.4 Can the 14% of respondents whom believed that a blame culture was 
predominant, be convinced that there is a fair blame culture here at The Christie? 
The managers interviewed felt there was an “open and fair blame culture” but 
agreed that some incidents resulted in disciplinary procedures, which could be a 
barrier to incident reporting.  
“14% is quite a small number, and probably represents the members of staff that have been 
disciplined and who would therefore agree that there is a blame culture” 
The respondents were asked to consider this model (Cultural web) and complete 
before the interview.   
 
 
 
        Rituals & routines 
• Nursing/ Science/ 
Medical  degree 
entrance 
• Short staffed 
• Low morale 
 
The Paradigm 
• Patient Safety is paramount 
•  Avoid errors 
• Errors  seen as a failure of 
duty -  report errors 
               
          Stories & myths 
• ‘Whistle blowing’ is Taboo 
• Litigation Loss of job  
• Don’t challenge senior staff 
• Blame culture 
Symbols 
 
• Stethoscope 
 
 
Power structures 
• Consultant leadership 
• Layers Senior managers 
• Risk/Quality 
Management 
              
                          Control systems 
• Use of incident report forms 
• Risk register 
•       Command and Control 
•  Audit  
   Organisational structure 
• Hierarchical 
• Mechanistic 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Cultural web showing its application to Clinical Incident Reporting at The Christie NHS 
Foundation Trust (Source: Author and Director of Nursing and Clinical Governance, 2009). 
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Commentary on the culture of incident reporting at The Christie 
It was agreed by all interviewees that the cultural web model identified key cultural 
issues which needed to be addressed: 
Symbols- doctors very rarely reported incidents; all interviewees agreed that “there 
is an expectation that nurses would complete IRF”. It was also agreed that doctors 
should take more responsibility for incident reporting. 
Power structure- Interviewees agreed that the Medical Director should provide 
leadership on the issue of incident reporting by medical staff. The NSS data (Q23e) 
indicates that senior management is willing to act on feedback; therefore this issue 
can be followed up. 
Organisational structure- the hierarchical structure creates barriers to shared 
learning. All interviewees agreed that managers shared learning from incidents and 
incidents were openly discussed at the Risk committee, Quality meetings and 
Clinical and Research Governance Committee. However, it was agreed that 
“managers should do more to cascade learning to frontline staff”. NSS data (Q16a –Q16h) 
indicates that senior management is performing above the national average (HCC, 
2009). Q16b indicates effective communication between senior managers and 
staff, but cascading learning from incident reporting would be the role of junior 
managers and this is not directly assessed by the survey.    
Control systems-Interviewees agreed that it was difficult to control incident 
reporting and that staff had a duty to report incidents. 
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Rituals and routines- staff say they are too busy to report incidents, yet claim to 
always report incidents in the National staff survey (HCC, 2009). Because 
wards/departments are short staffed it has become part of the routine to think that 
they are too busy to report incidents.  
Stories & myths-stories about patient death and loss of job create a barrier to 
incident reporting. It was agreed that these views could be dispelled by “educating 
staff and sharing the outcome incidents with grassroots staff”. 
 
4.12 Secondary Data Result 
KF 23. Fairness and effectivess of procedures for reporting errors, near misses or 
incidents (n=440) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n=440 
n=440 
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Comments 
NSS data (Q25a) show that staff are witnessing incidents, there is a difference 
between staff saying that they report incidents and the actual level of reporting. 
NSS data (Q25b) could be adding to this confusion because it lacks clarity about 
who is actually doing the reporting. There could be an assumption that a colleague 
has reported an incident when in fact they have not.  
 
Comments 
NSS data (Q26b) is supported by the primary data, staff are encouraged to report 
incidents, the induction programme is an important starting point for this.  
There has been an increase in the level of confidentiality associated with incident 
reporting and the trust is now in line with the national average. 
 
n=440 
n=440 
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Comments 
NSS data (Q26d) supports primary data findings, there is a minority of staff that 
feel blamed and punished following an incident.  
 
 
 
Comments 
NSS data (Q18a) and (Q18b) indicate that the trust is below the national average 
on the issue of whistle blowing and confidentiality. This area has not improved 
since 2007 and requires action as it could be a barrier to reporting.  
 
 
 
 
n=440 
n=440 
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Commentary on the culture based on the NSS findings 
 Staff were asked questions to assess the climate and culture of incident reporting 
in their trust (n=440). In particular, the questions asked whether staff are aware of 
the procedures for reporting errors, near misses and incidents; to what extent staff 
feel that the trust encourages such reports, and then treats the reports fairly and 
confidentially; and to what extent the trust takes action to ensure that such 
incidents do not happen again. Possible scores range from 1 to 5, with 1 
representing unfair and ineffective procedures, and 5 representing fair and 
effective procedures. The trust's score of 3.64 was in the highest (best) 20% of 
acute specialist trusts in England (HCC, 2009). NSS data supports findings of the 
primary data. 
 
4.14 Learning Lessons - Self-completion Questionnaires  
Q11. If you suspected an incident was a one off and unlikely to reoccur would you 
report it? 
 
Figure 31: Reporting a one off incident  
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Q12. Do you feel it is important to report near misses? 
 
 
Figure 31: Reporting near misses 
 
 
Commentary on reporting near misses 
 
91% of staff completing the self-completion questionnaire stated that they report 
near misses.100% of doctors say that they would report an incident even if they 
thought it was a one-off incident, yet when the question is asked in a slightly 
different way referring to reporting near misses only 92% agree that they would 
report all near misses, this response is contradictory.  
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Q13. Who do you feel is responsible for completing incident report forms? 
 
Figure 32: Who is responsible for completing IRF 
Comment 
The majority of staff across all professional groups felt that everyone was 
responsible for reporting an incident. This could result in an incident not being 
reported as no one takes responsibility for it. If the individual involved in an incident 
ensured that the IRF was completed, the reporting rate might be improved.  
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Q16. Do you receive regular feedback on the lessons learnt from recent incidents 
within your department? 
 
Figure 33: Incident feedback mechanisms 
Comment  
The majority of staff indicate that they do not get feedback this is not supported by 
the results of NSS data. The primary data suggests that most feedback occurs in 
department meetings and is delivered by managers. 
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Q17. Thinking about an incident you have been directly involved in/witnessed, did 
you receive individual feedback? 
 
Figure 34: Staff receiving feedback following an incident 
 
Figure 35: Further analysis of feedback data 
Further analysis of the data showed that 37% of those that agreed that they never 
got feedback also answered no to having received feedback. Interestingly, 10% of 
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those that said that they never get feedback also said they received feedback from 
a manger or via department meetings. 
 
Q.19. Have you shared reporting on incidents with other ward areas in order for 
them to learn from incidents occurring in your area? 
 
 
Figure 36: Sharing learning from incidents 
 
 
Comment 
Sharing knowledge gained from an incident generally does not occur; this is true 
for all professorial groups. 
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Q18. Did the incident result in a change in your practice? 
 
 
Figure 37: Change in your practice following an incident 
Q20. Do you feel that reporting incidents lead to changes in practice? 
 
 
Figure 38: Reporting an incident leads to change in practice 
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Commentary on change following an incident 
47% of respondents said that change did not occur following an incident, yet 79% 
of respondents agree that change should follow an incident. Interestingly, 71% of 
respondents also reported that no sharing of learning from incidents occurred. 
4.15 Secondary Data Results 
KF22. Percentage of staff reporting errors, near misses or incidents witnessed in 
the last month (n=440) 
 
 
Comments 
NSS data (KF22) indicate that staff are reporting incidents , this is not suported by 
NPSA (2008) data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n=440 
n=440 
n=440 
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Comments 
NSS data (Q26e-g) suggests that staff are happy with the learning which results 
from incidents, this finding is not supported by the primary data. It may be possible 
that some staff modify their responses according to whom asking the questions.  
NSS data (Q19d) is evidence that training needs to be improved and is supported 
by the primary data. 
NSS data (Q16a-d) indicates that senior management communication within the 
trust is good. This may be true in general, but evidence from the primary data does 
not support this with respect to incident reporting. 
 
n=440 
n=440 
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Commentary on NSS data 
 
 99% of staff who had witnessed such an error, near miss or incident in the last 
month said that they, or a colleague, had reported it. The trust's score of 99% was 
in the highest (best) 20% of acute specialist trusts in England (HCC, 2009). 
However, when the issue of near miss reporting was phrased slightly differently 
(Q11-primary data) 14% of respondents said they would not report a one off 
incident. This is a significant finding because a one off incident could be the result 
of near misses which are unreported.  
 
4.16 Semi-structured Interview Results 
SSI-QC1. How would you describe the culture at The Christie in relation to learning 
from incidents? 
All managers agreed that there was a robust system in place for learning from 
significant untoward incidents; however, for the minor incidents learning did not 
always occur. 
“This is an area that would benefit from further work, especially getting down to the 
‘grassroots’ level” 
SSI-QL.1 88% of respondents agrees that it’s important to report near misses, 
however, only 78% actual report –please comment. 
“There is the perception that nothing would be done about near misses and so there is no 
point in reporting them” 
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All managers agreed that “if feedback was effective then ‘grassroots’ staff would be aware 
of corrective action taken”.  
“Staff need to become more proactive about incident reporting to prevent incidents occurring 
and to aid learning”  
SSI-QL.3 75% of respondents said they did not share incidents and so learning 
from incidents was limited, what can be done to reduce this barrier?   
All interviewees felt that this had to be improved, suggestions included the 
following:  
• Newsletter 
• Local incident co-ordinators 
• E-mail feedback on incidents 
   
4.18 Resources- Self-completion Questionnaire Results 
Q4. Are you aware that the hospital has an incident reporting system? 
 
Staff Aware of the incident reporting system 
n = 160 
 % 
Yes 100 
No 0 
 
Table 22: Staff aware of the hospital incident reporting system 
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Q5. Do you have access to incident report forms (IRFs)? 
 
 Access to the incident reporting system 
n = 160 
 % 
Yes 95 
No 3 
 Do not know 2 
 
Table 23: Staff has access to the hospital incident reporting system 
Commentary on the reporting system 
 
From the results it can be seen that staff are aware of the incident reporting system 
and have access to IRF. 
 
  
4.19 Semi-structured Interview Results 
A SWOT analysis (Appendix K) of The Christie carried out for the annual report 
(2007) was adapted by the author and the Director of Nursing and Clinical 
Governance. It summarises the internal capability assessment and strategic 
capability which impact on the strategic development. Three key findings relating to 
the weakness of the incident reporting system were identified. There is limited 
incident reporting as shown by the NPSA report (2007), a lack of a web-based 
reporting system (a paper system has many disadvantages) and limited feedback 
mechanism.  
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4.20 Commentary 
The SWOT indicates that resources are available within the trust and that there is a 
strong resource base in spite of recent financial losses. However, more resources 
must be targeted to the areas of importance, such as local training and shared 
learning. 
 
4.21 Objective 3- main findings 
To assess the range of strategic/operational choices available to reduce identified 
barriers to incident reporting, to examine the factors affecting implementation of 
strategic/operational choice, draw conclusions and make recommendations. 
Q21. Which of the following do you think would increase your incident reporting? 
 
 
 
 
Table 25:  The results of those members of staff that agree with the comments 
 
Overall sample size 
                         (N= 160) 
Nursing 
Staff 
(n=113) 
Doctors 
(n=13) 
AHP 
(n=27) 
Student 
(n=7) 
1.Providing feedback 90% 77% 89% 88% 
2.Making reporting mandatory 53% 38% 52% 50% 
3.Clarification on what constitutes an incident 71% 62% 78% 63% 
4.A real time reporting system 54% 54% 52% 50% 
5.A web based reporting system  45% 62% 56% 38% 
6.A phone based reporting system 24% 31% 19% 13% 
7.A local incident coordinator 59% 62% 56% 63% 
8.Improved training 75% 69% 67% 75% 
9.Anonymous reporting 53% 46% 52% 63% 
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Q21. Which of the following do you think would increase your incident reporting? 
 
 
Table 26:  The results of those members of staff that disagree with the comments 
4.22 Semi-Structured Interview- Results 
Please rank the following measures to reduce the barriers to incident reporting 
 
 
Overall sample size 
                            (N= 160) 
Nursing 
Staff 
(n=113) 
Doctors 
(n=13) 
AHP 
(n=27) 
Student 
(n=7) 
1.Providing feedback 7% 15% 7% 14% 
2.Making reporting mandatory 42% 38% 37% 25% 
3.Clarification on what constitutes an incident 25% 8% 19% 13% 
4.A real time reporting system 35% 23% 33% 25% 
5.A web based reporting system  47% 15% 30% 50% 
6.A phone based reporting system 65% 46% 70% 75% 
7.A local incident coordinator 35% 23% 30% 38% 
8.Improved training 17% 15% 26% 13% 
9.Anonymous reporting 40% 31% 41% 25% 
     
 
 
Quality 
manager  
Risk 
manager 
Director of 
Nursing and 
Clinical 
Governance 
1.Providing feedback 1 1 2 
2.Making reporting mandatory 8 9 9 
3.Clarification on what constitutes an incident 2 3 3 
4.A real time reporting system 6 7 8 
5.A web based reporting system  3 2 1 
6.A phone based reporting system 7 8 6 
7.A local incident coordinator 5 6 4 
8.Improved training 4 4 5 
9.Anonymous reporting 9 5 7 
    
Table 27: Interviewee ranking of preventative measures to reduce barriers 
to incident reporting 
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All interviewees agreed that providing feedback was vital to reduce this barrier to 
incident reporting. After some discussion it was agreed with the Risk Manager, that 
when the web based reporting system was introduced that “it will be set up so that the 
initial reporter automatically receives feedback on an incident once it has been closed”. All 
interviewees agreed that mandatory reporting was not enforceable. There was 
some disagreement about the need for local incident coordinators. The Quality 
Manager felt that “the trust already had enough link workers and an incident coordinator 
should be a manager who could track trends”. Interviewees were in agreement that 
improved training was required and that its inclusion in the annual mandatory 
training would reduce barriers to reporting. All interviewees agreed that anonymous 
reporting was not acceptable to the trust, however, after some discussion it was 
agreed that the new web based system would “give the reporter the choice of reporting 
anonymously by providing a contact number which could be used for this purpose”.   
4.23 Commentary on strategic choices 
Respondents of the self-completion questionnaire ranked the following areas as 
important to the strategic/operational choices available to reduce identified barriers 
to incident reporting: 
1. Providing feedback 
2. Improved training 
3. Clarification on what constitutes an incident 
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These findings compared well with the findings from the semi-structured interviews 
with agreement on two out of three. There was general agreement between all 
three interviewees ranking the top three as follows: 
1.  Providing feedback 
2. A web based reporting system 
3. Clarification on what constitutes an incident 
Providing feedback is viewed as important by all groups and is a barrier that could 
be resolved relatively easily and without any significant financial outlay. A web 
based reporting system was ranked as seventh by self-completion questionnaire 
respondents. This was viewed as more important to senior management, possibly, 
because this is a route that has already been embarked upon. Clarification of what 
constitutes an incident was ranked three by both groups. 
 All interviewees agree that the major factor that would affect implementation of 
any strategic/ operational choices would be a “financial limitation”. The trust would 
have to take an approach or a combination of approaches which require little or no 
financial input. It was suggested by the Risk Manager that “improving feedback by the 
use of a ‘newsletter’ would be the best way to resolve this issue”. This is because staff 
would see what the main incidents were and what learning occurred as a result.  
After analysis of the findings the conceptual framework was revised.  
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4.24 Revised conceptual framework 
 
                                                Resources 
 
 
Figure 39: Revised conceptual framework (Author, 2009)  
 
The barriers identified in the literature review were useful for the development of 
the questionnaire and were therefore a vital element of the conceptual framework. 
However, although the STEEPLE and SWOT analysis provided interesting 
information it was not critical to answering the research question, and can be 
eliminated from the conceptual framework.  
This simplification of the conceptual framework would help to improve the focus on 
the research question. Two new elements that could be included are issues of 
                                                              Barriers to incident reporting 
 
Blame Lack of 
anonymity 
 
Fear 
 
No 
Feedback 
Lack of 
clarity 
about what 
to report 
Lack of 
time 
 
Culture 
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leadership as this would drive the overall cultural values within the organisation, 
and finally professional codes of conduct which would serve as a reminder to staff 
of their duty with respect to their duty of incident reporting (figure 39). 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter will review the research findings in terms of the three objectives 
shown below (figure 40). 
 
Figure 40: Research objectives 
 
5.1 Objective 1: To identify the general issues which influence 
clinical incident reporting in the NHS, through a literature review. 
 
The review of the literature did identify that one in ten patients admitted to hospital 
results in an adverse event, resulting in a NHS payout of £400 million a year (DH, 
2000).  
According to the NPSA, (2003) up to half of these incidents could have been 
prevented. The availability of literature on incident reporting in the NHS was 
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sparse. Most of the literature refers to nurses and doctors and does not refer to 
other professional groups.  
 
Organisations with high levels of reporting have a strong reporting culture (Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2001).The NHS position on incident reporting is that avoidable 
failures occur, untoward events recur and learning does not reliably lead to 
correction throughout the NHS. Incident reporting has been identified as a key 
factor in establishing an effective risk management culture (Darren, 2006).  
 
Under-reporting is an organisational wide issue in the NHS (Firth-Cozens, 1997, 
O’Dowd, 2006). Several categories to barriers to incident reporting have been 
identified and include the following: 
1. Cultural barriers to incident reporting 
2. Organisational barriers to incident reporting 
3. Barriers to incident reporting as a result of fear 
4. Barriers to organisational learning from incidents 
 
5.2 Objective 2: To identify any barriers to incident reporting at 
the Christie NHS Foundation Trust and assess the culture of 
learning from incidents.  
The major barriers to incident reporting at The Christie have been identified and 
listed in order of importance as:  
1. Staff are too busy to report incidents (a finding also identified by Coyle, 
2005). This barrier was not accepted by senior management interviewed. 
All management were in agreement that this was an excuse that staff used 
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for not carrying out their professional duty of reporting incidents and that 
staff had twenty four hours in which to report an incident. However, staff 
perception about being too busy was supported by the secondary data 
from the national staff survey (HCC.2009).  
2. Lack of clarity about what to report (a finding supported by Barach, 2000), 
this was an issue for all groups and senior management were in 
agreement that this was an area where they could do more. 
3. Difficulty reporting a more senior member of staff. Doctors and students 
found this barrier to be a problem, because of the associated links to 
career development that a senior member of staff might hold. 
4. Never getting any feedback on action taken; was found to be a barrier for 
‘frontline’ staff. The Governance team were good at feeding back findings 
from investigations to divisional management.  Divisional Management 
were found to be good at feeding back to junior managers on serious 
untoward incidents (SUI), but did not always ensure that findings were 
cascaded down to the ‘frontline’ staff.  
5. Form takes too long to complete. Senior management agreed that the form 
could be reviewed and shorten slightly and they were keen to stress that 
there were some sections which would remain mandatory because details 
were required in order to carry out meaningful investigations. 
   
The culture of incident reporting at The Christie has improved over the last few 
years; nonetheless, there is still room for improvement. Management has 
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successfully established a ‘fair blame’ culture at The Christie NHS Foundation 
Trust, which has supported the reporting culture within the trust. 
The associated culture of learning from incidents is lacking for a number of 
reasons: 
1. The main focus of learning appears to be associated with SUI. There are 
systems in place for full investigations; however any learning is not always 
disseminated beyond the management level. 
2. There is little evidence of sharing learning from incidents beyond the areas 
in which the incident occurred. 
3. The person reporting the incident initially often does not receive any 
feedback on the outcome of the incident investigation and therefore 
considers the process to be pointless. 
4. 47% of respondents said that change did not occur following an incident, 
which allows reoccurrence of system incidents to take place.  
 
5.3 Objective 3: To assess the range of strategic/operational 
choices available to reduce identified barriers to incident 
reporting, to examine the factors affecting implementation of 
strategic/operational choice, draw conclusions and make 
recommendations. 
 
‘Frontline’ staff would like to see the following operational changes (listed in order 
of importance) made to reduce the barriers to incident reporting: 
1. The provision of clear feedback following the investigation of an incident. 
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2. The clarification on what constitutes an incident 
3. Improved training related to incident reporting 
There was some disagreement amongst senior management as to the first issue 
that needed to be addressed, but overall the following were viewed to be most 
important: 
1. The provision of clear feedback following the investigation of an incident. 
2. A web based reporting system  
3. The clarification on what constitutes an incident 
 
The organisational changes required to reduce the barriers to incident reporting 
suggested by ‘frontline’ staff would not require any set up cost. Number 1 above 
could be provided by management within their current role. Number 2 could be 
provided by the governance team. Number 3 would require a significant amount of 
time to be invested initially to set up training programmes and workshops. 
Management listed the changes as stated above, however, there would need to be 
a significant financial input to cover the purchase and associated training of   a web 
based incident reporting system.  The trust is already committed to this and the 
web based system should be implemented by May 2009. 
5.4 Summary 
The research into barriers to incident reporting at The Christie has produced 
evidence to support the view that there are barriers to incident reporting within the 
trust. Although the results are only applicable to The Christie NHS Foundation 
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Trust, there is evidence that these findings are valid because they are in line with 
other NHS studies which have been carried out independently. For example Evan 
(2006) found the lack of a clear feedback mechanism was a barrier to incident 
reporting. Barach (2000) found that staff were unsure about what to report and this 
created a barrier to incident reporting. The similarities between these findings and 
those reported by others serve to support the reliability and validity of the 
observations found in this study.  
There were a number of issues that were identified as during the course of the 
study that would benefit from further research: 
1. A low proportion of doctors participated in this study; therefore a larger study 
focusing solely on the attitudes of doctors would give a better 
understanding of the view of doctors in relation to incident reporting. 
2. A study of culture within the medical profession would give an insight into 
the reasons why doctors are low reporters of incidents. 
3. A study that focuses specifically on the AHP’s would give a clearer 
indication into their views and could validate these findings as the literature 
is sparse in this area.   
4. If the perception of staff about their workload were found to be correct. A 
study to look at the job design from the perceptive of the employee as well 
as managers would help to resolve this issue and manage expectations.  
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5.5 Study Limitations 
 
• The overrepresentation of nurses in the research sample reflects their 
interest in participating and might have caused results bias by oversampling 
from this group of staff. 
 
• Findings from this study should be considered in terms of limitations 
imposed by the design.  
• Doctors in the study were not statistically represented as there were only 13 
participants. 
 
From the results it was concluded that there are a number of barriers to incident 
reporting at The Christie NHS Foundation. There are a number of 
recommendations which could be implemented to reduce the barriers.  
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Chapter 6 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The barriers identified can only be reduced if positive actions to eliminate 
them are undertaken. Below is a list of changes required in order to facilitate 
this. 
6.2 Changes required 
• Table 28 highlights the barriers to incident reporting and shows the 
recommended action plan 2009-2010. 
• Cultural and learning barriers to incident reporting and recommended action 
plan are shown in table 29. 
• Strategic /operational choices to reduce barriers to incident reporting and 
recommended action plan are illustrated in table 30.  
6.3 Summary 
Priority should be given to reducing the length of the IRF and providing 
clear polices and guidelines about what constitutes a reportable incident. 
It is important that staff understand what to report, before the introduction 
of the web based reporting system. Otherwise the Trust will have spent a 
lot of money without having the associated benefits. The overall cost will 
vary depending on the band of manager responsible for each task; total 
cost should be approximately £144,000 (first year). Feeding back to staff 
is important and the web based system will be helpful in improving this. 
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Barriers to incident reporting – Recommended action plan 2009-2010 
 
Barriers identified  Trust Action  Lead  Timescale Cost Performance 
Targets 
1.Staff are too busy to 
report incidents 
To review job design and 
assess workload  in patient 
safety critical areas 
 
Link to appraisal 
Ensure clarity of roles at 
individual and team meetings 
Human Resource 
Manager/Operational 
Managers 
General/Division 
Managers 
June 2010 The cost of management 
time will vary depending on 
their band. 
An increase in the 
number of incidents 
reported, in line with 
NPSA targets. 
2.Lack of clarity about 
what to report 
Raise awareness of incident 
reporting and provide clear 
guidelines on what constitutes 
a reportable incident defined 
by location/department 
 
Development of intranet space 
Risk Manager and 
Quality Manager 
IT /Communications 
department 
June 2009 
(To be 
completed 
before the 
introduction of 
the web-based 
incident 
reporting 
system. 
Four weeks band 7/8a time 
working on this project cost 
£4,500 
IT department 3hours work 
band 7 cost £75 
Cross check that 
incident description 
fit into the categories 
outlined in guidelines 
issued. 
3.Difficulty reporting a 
more senior member of 
staff 
Introduction of a confidential 
helpline linked to the 
Governance team. 
Risk Manager  June 2009 £180 dedicated phone and 
phone line. Incident 
coordinator to investigate -
Management time 
Numbers of calls 
logged and follow up 
action. 
4.Never get any 
feedback on action taken 
Improve communication 
process across the Trust. 
Assess methods to ensure 
that all audiences are 
captured. 
General/Divisional mangers to 
improve communication within 
divisions. 
General/Division 
Managers 
 
December 2009 The cost of management 
time will vary depending on 
their band. 
Check the number of 
feedback notices 
match the number of 
incidents closed. 
5.Form takes too long to 
complete 
Review IRF and remove 
sections which are no longer 
required 
 
Ensure that all sections of the 
web base system are 
absolutely necessary to 
commence   an investigation. 
Governance Team May 2009 The cost of management 
time will vary depending on 
their band. 
Audit this after the 
IRF has been 
modified. 
      
Table 28: Barriers to incident reporting – Recommended action plan 2009-2010 (source: Author, 2009) 
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Cultural and learning barriers to incident reporting – Recommended action plan 2009 
 
Barriers identified  Trust Action  Lead  Timescale Cost Performance 
Targets 
The culture of incident 
reporting at The Christie has 
improved over the last few 
years; none the less, there is 
still room for improvement. 
 
Continue to promote the ‘fair’ blame 
culture. 
 
Managers to ensure staff that have 
been disciplined understand why 
they have been disciplined.  
General/Divisional 
managers 
Ongoing The cost of management 
time will vary depending 
on their band. 
Audit 
Learning is not always 
disseminated beyond the 
management level. 
 
General/Divisional mangers to 
improve communication within 
divisions. 
 
Ensure that managers cascade 
learning from incidents to the 
appropriate staff groups  
General/Divisional 
managers 
October 2009 The cost of management 
time will vary depending 
on their band. 
Audit 
There is little evidence of 
sharing learning from 
incidents beyond the areas 
in which the incident 
occurred. 
 
Improve communication links across 
the Trust between all divisions  
Reinstate the monthly newsletter. 
Provide intranet alert updates. 
 
Utilise team briefs and staff 
meetings to communicate learning.  
Quality manager June 2009 –
September 2009 
(staged 
approach 
newsletter and 
intranet updates 
followed by  
The cost of management 
time will vary depending 
on their band. 
Audit 
The person reporting the 
incident initially often does 
not receive any feedback on 
the outcome of the incident 
investigation and therefore 
considers the process to be 
pointless. 
 
Feedback mechanism that links the 
original reporter to the incident to 
ensure that they receive a copy of 
the report once the incident is 
closed. 
Governance 
Team 
IT Department 
May 2009 The cost of management 
time will vary depending 
on their band. 
Audit 
47% of respondents said 
that change did not occur 
following an incident, which 
allows incidents to reoccur. 
 
Communicate changes that result 
from incidents via newsletters, 
intranet and team brief. 
 
Governance 
Team 
IT Department 
July 2009 The cost of management 
time will vary depending 
on their band. 
Audit 
 
     
Table 29: Cultural and learning barriers to incident reporting – Recommended action plan 2009- (source: Author, 2009) 
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Strategic /operational choices to reduce barriers to incident reporting -Action plan 2009 
 
Barriers identified  Trust Action  Lead  Timescale Cost Performance 
Targets 
The provision of clear 
feedback following the 
investigation of an 
incident. 
 
Standardise approach and 
documentation for root cause 
analysis (RCA). 
  
Set up e-mail feedback links 
directly to every member of 
staff who initiates an incident 
investigation.  
 
Ensure managers cascade the 
outcome of the investigations to 
staff. 
Governance Team 
IT Department 
General / Divisional 
Managers 
 
May 2009 (set up 
during the installation 
of the web based 
system) 
The cost of management 
time will vary depending on 
their band. 
Audit 
The clarification on what 
constitutes an incident 
 
Raise awareness of incident 
reporting and provide clear 
guidelines on what constitutes 
a reportable incident defined by 
location/department 
 
Development of intranet space 
Risk Manager and 
Quality Manager 
IT /Communications 
department 
July 2009 Four weeks band 7/8a time 
working on this project cost 
£4,500 
IT department 3hours work 
band 7 cost £75 
Cross check that 
incident 
description fit into 
the categories 
outlined in 
guidelines issued. 
Improved training related 
to incident reporting 
 
Develop an incident reporting 
training package  
Include incident reporting on 
the mandatory training 
programme 
Identify staff training needs 
Arrange necessary training  
Raise awareness of the 
incident reporting process 
Develop an e-learning incident 
reporting training package 
General / Divisional 
Managers 
Governance team 
L&D (learning and 
development) Team 
Service leads and 
Clinical Directors 
September 2009 The cost of management 
time will vary depending on 
their band. 
Monitor via PDP 
(personal 
development 
plan) 
 
Monitor monthly 
via Performance 
review. 
A web based reporting 
system 
Introduce a web based incident 
reporting system 
 
Risk Manager  
IT department 
L&D 
May 2009 £80,000 plus £4,000 
annually for maintenance 
(Funding already approved, 
no business case required) 
Installation 
completed by 
30/05/09. 
 
     
Table 30: Strategic /operational choices to reduce barriers to incident reporting – Recommended action plan 2009- 
(source: Author, 2009) 
  
Appendix A 
                The types of incidents that are reported by The Christie NHS 
Foundation Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source:  National Patient Safety Agency Report October 2007 to March 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix B 
              The number of incidents submitted to the NRLS by month  
from The Christie NHS Foundation Trust 
 
                Source:  NRLS report during the period 1 October 2007 to 31 March 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No incidents 
were reported 
for December 
2007, February 
and March 
2008  
  
Appendix C 
             Summary of the number and rate of incidents reported including late 
submissions 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
        
                   (Source: National Patient Safety Agency Report October 2007 to March 2008) 
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Appendix D 
    Risk Management Committee Structure and Internal Reporting 
Arrangements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              (Source: The Christie Risk Strategy policy, 2008) 
Board of directors 
Governance – Strategy – Finance & 
Operations 
Audit Committee 
Chair, Non-Exec 
All Non-Execs 
Auditors 
Financial and all non 
clinical corporate 
Governance 
Committee 
Chair, Non-Exec 
ALL Non-Execs  
 
Clinical and research 
Risk Committee 
Chair, CEO 
Hosp. Directors 
Div. Directors 
General Managers 
Corporate Managers 
Clinical & Research 
Governance 
All Governance issues  
Monthly Bi monthly Bi monthly 
Health & Safety 
Management of staff management 
collaborative Health & Safety 
approach  
Quarterly 
  
Appendix E 
 The Christie NHS Foundation Trust Balance sheet, 2007-2008 
 
(Source: The Christie NHS Foundation Trust annual report, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix F 
             Models used in the development of the Conceptual 
Framework 
 
                                             (Source: Author, 2009) 
Models Objective 
addressed 
by the 
model 
Method of data 
collection 
Questions which 
help to answer 
the objective 
Reasons for 
inclusion 
Critique 
EVR 1, 2and3 Questionnaire 
Literature 
Review 
   
E 1 Literature 
Review 
SSI 
STEEPLE analysis Overview of 
external drivers 
Produces a 
vast 
amount of 
data 
V 2 Questionnaire Question 10 
parts, 7,10,13,14. 
Question 14 
Question 15 
Question 22 
To assess the overall 
value of the 
organisation based 
on the cultural 
values and 
attitudes towards 
learning from 
incidents. 
 
R 2 and 3 Questionnaire 
SSI 
Question 4 
Question 5 
Question 6 
Question 8 
Question 10 part 
1, 2, 9, 11, 12 
and 15 
  
Cultural 
web 
1 and 2 Questionnaire Question 14 
Question 15 
Question 22 
Overview of cultural 
issues which create 
a barrier to incident 
reporting and 
prevents learning 
Difficult to 
analysis 
objectively 
Senge’s 
5th 
Discipline 
2 Questionnaire 
 
 
SSI 
System thinking 
Question 11, 12 
and 19 
Personal Mastery 
Question 13 and 
19 
Team Learning 
Question 16 and 
17 
Plans to achieve 
a shared vision 
To help develop 
learning from 
incidents 
Mental 
models are 
personal 
deep-
seated 
views which 
are difficult 
to analyse, 
there is an 
assumption 
that people 
are willing 
to share 
very 
personal 
views. 
  
 
 
Appendix G 
I am currently in the final year of my Masters in Business Administration at Bolton 
Business School, University of Bolton. For my dissertation I am conducting research 
into the potential barriers to clinical incident reporting. This study excludes falls as 
figures indicate that there is no under-reporting of falls. 
Your views are crucial to my study. I would be grateful if you could answer a few 
straightforward questions which would help me understand the views of NHS staff 
with regard to this topic. The results of the survey will enable me to have a better 
understanding of incident reporting at the trust and will provide help for managers 
to improve reporting rates. 
I would also like to undertake a number of interviews on a one-to-one basis. If you 
would like to participate in these please contact me on the number below or via e-
mail.  These interviews provide qualitative information as to why participants hold 
certain views and allow the participants to offer their views in more detail. 
The questionnaires and the reported results of all the research will be completely 
anonymous and will remain strictly confidential; participation in the research is 
completely voluntary, but your assistance would be appreciated. Any information 
collected will only be used for its intended purpose, which is to answer the research 
questions relating incident reporting.  
I understand that completing the questionnaire may be an inconvenience to you, 
but I would be grateful for your time, and I thank you in advance for completing it. 
 
Thank you for your assistance. 
 
Sylvia Blake 
Blood Transfusion Manager 
E-mail Sylvia.blake@christie.nhs.uk 
Telephone: 0161-446-3316  
 
  
 
Introduction - Studies from across the world have shown that clinical mistakes are a major 
threat to the safety of patient care (WHO, 2004). 
 
Background- 22% of incidents and 39% of near misses are unreported (O’Dowd, 2006). 
 
Objective -    to determine if barriers to clinical incident reporting exist in this Trust. 
 
Date              15/12/08 
 
 
   
 
Please note that this questionnaire is anonymous and no reports or 
presentations will identify individual members of staff, their details or comments 
 
Section 1: Demographics 
 
1. What band are you? 
 
Band 4 or below    Band 5     Band 6     Band 7     Band 8a     Other  
   
 
2. To which of the following staff groups do you belong?  
 
  
Medical       Nursing        AHP      Student  
 
3. How long have you worked for the Trust? 
 
Less than 6 months   6-12 months     More than 12 months  
Section 2:  System Knowledge 
 
 4. Are you aware that the hospital has an incident reporting system? 
Yes                     No   
 
5. Do you have access to incident report forms (IRFs)? 
 
Yes                     No       Do not know     
    
6. Do you feel confident about completing an incident report form? 
  
Yes                     No   
7. In your time at this Trust, have you completed an incident report form 
(please do NOT include falls)? 
 
Yes                     No   
8. Do you know what constitutes a reportable incident? 
 
Yes                     No   
9. How would you define an incident? 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Section 3: Barriers to incident reporting 
10. Would any of the following prohibit you from completing an incident form? 
  
 
……………………………………………………………………………….......... 
 
 
Agree Disagree Don’t know 
Lack of confidentiality/anonymity    
Too busy    
Fear of repercussion     
Fear of disciplinary action    
Fear of litigation     
Labelling & blame for raising concerns    
Pointless, nothing will be done about it    
Fear of career and personal reputation at 
stake 
   
Lack of clarity about what to report    
Difficulty reporting a more senior member of 
staff 
   
Never get any feedback on action taken    
 Reporting interrupts the work process      
 A culture of silence is the norm    
Everyone makes errors    
Form takes too long to complete    
Other, please state below    
  
........................................................................................................ 
11. If you suspected an incident was a one off and unlikely to reoccur would 
you report it? 
  
 Yes                     No   
 
12. Do you feel it is important to report near misses? 
 
Yes                     No   
 
13.  Who do you feel is responsible for completing incident report forms? 
 
  Individual involved in the incident       Witness to the incident        Manager      
Everyone  
 
14.  Would you feel comfortable reporting an error made by someone else? 
 
Yes                     No     
15. Do you view whistle blowing and incident reporting as the same?   
 
     Yes                     No  
Section 4: Learning Lessons 
16.  Do you receive regular feedback on the lessons learnt from recent 
incidents within your department?  
 
  Yes, from manager  
 Yes, at department meetings     
  Yes, in a newsletter    
  Yes, via email  
 No  
  Other, please state……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
17.  Thinking about an incident you have been directly involved in/witnessed, 
did you receive individual feedback? 
  Yes, from manager  
 Yes, at dept meeting     
  Yes, in a newsletter    
  Yes, via email  
 No  
Not applicable 
 Other, please state……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
18.  Did this result in a change in your practice? 
 
Yes                     No   
19.  Have you shared reporting on incidents with other ward areas in order for 
them to learn from incidents occurring in your area? 
Yes                     No  
 
20.  Do you feel that reporting incidents lead to changes in practice? 
 
Yes                     No  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
21.  Which of the following do you think would increase your incident 
reporting? 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22.  In your view which of the following best describes this organisation’s 
culture? 
 
  Blame culture  
 No blame culture     
  Fair blame culture    
 Other, please state……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree Disagree 
Providing feedback   
Making reporting mandatory   
Clarification on what constitutes an incident   
 A real time reporting system   
 A web based reporting system   
A phone based reporting system   
A local incident coordinator     
Improved training   
Anonymous reporting   
Others, please state below   
  
 
Section 5: Additional Comments 
 
Do you have any comments relating to incident reporting which would help to 
improve incident reporting, improve learning and reduce the risk of harm to 
patients? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………….……………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………….………………….……………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………….……………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Thanks for your help. Feedback from this survey will be available to all staff via 
the intranet in May 2009. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix H 
Semi Structured Interview Questions 
 
Thank you taking the time to meet with me. 
I will give a brief overview of my findings so far. 
Demographic profile – Quality Manager, Risk Manager and Director of Clinical 
Governance 
 
Give overview of findings from self –completed questionnaires. 
210 questionnaires were issued and 160 returned- excellent response rate. 
67% of respondents were between bands 4-6.  
7O% of respondents were from the nursing profession 
8% medics 
17% AHP 
5% students (nursing and AHP) 
82% of respondents have worked for the trust for more than 12 months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The following response was given about Barriers to incident reporting: 
Q10 part 13. Would any of the following prohibit you from completing an incident 
form? 
 
SSI- QS1. Can comment on these findings? 
SSI- QS2. Confidentiality is a barrier for 20% of nurses and 19% of AHP’s, how can this 
be addressed? 
SSI- QS3. How can the issue of fear (part 4, 5, 6 and 8) be reduced in order to 
improve the level of incident reporting? 
SSI-QS4.Some staff feel that it is pointless reporting incidents because nothing will be 
done, how are staff informed of the outcome of incidents and are staff involved in 
the introduction of change following an incident? This is important because 40% of 
nurses say they never get any feedback. 
 
Overall sample size 
                        (N= 160) 
Nursing 
staff 
(n=112) 
Doctors  
(n= 13) 
AHP 
(n=27) 
Student 
(n=8) 
1.Lack of confidentiality/anonymity 20% 0% 19% 0% 
2.Too busy 46% 23% 44% 36% 
3.Fear of repercussion  16% 8% 19% 13% 
4.Fear of disciplinary action 13% 8% 22% 0% 
5.Fear of litigation  15% 8% 19% 0% 
6.Labelling & blame for raising concerns 22% 8% 30% 13% 
7.Pointless, nothing will be done about it 25% 8% 30% 0% 
8.Fear of career and personal reputation at 
stake 
13% 8% 19% 0% 
9.Lack of clarity about what to report 21% 23% 30% 38% 
10.Difficulty reporting a more senior member 
of staff 
27% 38% 26% 38% 
11.Never get any feedback on action taken 40% 15% 26% 13% 
12.Reporting interrupts the work process   21% 15% 30% 0% 
13.A culture of silence is the norm 10% 8% 11% 25% 
14.Everyone makes errors 26% 15% 30% 63% 
15.Form takes too long to complete 21% 15% 30% 0% 
     
 SSI-QS5 Apart from the induction process , which is excellent at informing staff about 
the reporting system (100% aware of reporting system), is there any further training 
available on incident reporting?- there is some lack of clarity about what should be 
reporting. 90% of respondents said they knew what constitutes an incident, yet less 
than 10% could define what meant by an incident 
SSI-QS6 All staff groups especially medics find it difficult to report incidents involving 
a more senior member of staff, how can this be addressed? 
SSI-QS7 Staff feel that they are too busy and that reporting incidents interrupts the 
work, can you discuss resource allocation to reduce barriers to incident reporting. 
SSI-QS8 The IRF takes too long to complete, what are the plans and timescale to 
address this? 
SSI-QS9 Are there any further comments that you would like to add to the following 
models: STEEPLE, SWOT and EVR models.   
Culture 
SSI-QC.1 How would you describe the culture at The Christie in relation to incident 
reporting? 
SSI-QC.2  37% of respondents do not feel comfortable reporting an incident made 
by someone else, how might this be addressed? Most respondents feel that it was 
everyone’s responsibility to report incidents, this could remove ownership, what do 
you feel?- would it be better to reduce confusion by saying it is the responsibility of 
the individual involved in the incident to report it?  
SSI-QC.3 13% of respondents view incident reporting and whistle blowing in the 
same way, can you comment on this? 
SSI-QC.4  How can the 10% of respondents be convinced that there is a fair blame 
culture here at The Christie? 
Learning 
SSI-QC1. How would you describe the culture at The Christie in relation to learning 
from incidents? 
SSI-QL.1 88% of respondents agrees that it’s important to report near misses, 
however, only 78% actual report – please comment. 
SSI-QL.2 37% of respondents say they do not get feedback from incidents, how do 
you ensure that feedback reaches the frontline staff?  
SSI-QL.3 75% of respondents said they did not share incidents and so learning from 
incidents was limited, what can be done to reduce this barrier? 
 SSI-QL.4 How do managers support learning from incidents within the trust? 
SSI-QL.5 Can incident reporting be performance managed by a local agreement 
 
Resource 
SSI.QR.1 Do you feel that our paper based system creates a barrier to incident 
reporting?  
SSI .QR.2 What plans are there to address this? 
SSI. QR.3 Does it allow the capture of near misses? 
 
SSI.QR.1 Please comment on the following findings 
SSI.QR.2 What do you consider to be the most appropriate   strategic/ operational 
choices that are available to the trust to reduce barriers to incident reporting? 
SSI.QR.3 What are the factors that could affect the implementation of strategic/ 
operational choices?  
 
Do you have any comments that you would like to add? Are there any trust 
documents that might useful to review with respect to incident reporting? 
Thank you for your time. 
 
 
Overall sample size 
                         (N= 160) 
Nursing 
Staff 
(n=113) 
Doctors 
(n=13) 
AHP 
(n=27) 
Student 
(n=8) 
1.Providing feedback 90% 77% 89% 88% 
2.Making reporting mandatory 53% 38% 52% 50% 
3.Clarification on what constitutes an incident 71% 62% 78% 63% 
4.A real time reporting system 54% 54% 52% 50% 
5.A web based reporting system  45% 62% 56% 38% 
6.A phone based reporting system 24% 31% 19% 13% 
7.A local incident coordinator 59% 62% 56% 63% 
8.Improved training 75% 69% 67% 75% 
9.Anonymous reporting 53% 46% 52% 63% 
     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I 
Incident Reporting Form 
 
Use this form to record ALL accidents/incidents/hazards/near misses, to patients, staff 
and other persons and ANY case of known or suspected work or environment related 
ill health. 
• The completion and signing of this form does not constitute an admission of liability of any kind.  The Trust 
has a ‘fair blame’ policy,  recognising that when things have gone wrong the emphasis must be on taking 
corrective action to improve practice rather than to apportion  blame and take punitive action.  Disciplinary 
action will only be considered in exceptional circumstances.   
• Any equipment involved in the incident should be retained in safe keeping for examination. 
• Incidents involving death/serious injury must be reported immediately to the Chief Executive and Director 
of Nursing and Governance or their  Deputy in conjunction with the Major Incident Plan. 
• Complete ALL relevant sections of the form.  Please print clearly.  Record FACTS not OPINIONS.  Complete 
a separate form for  each person directly involved.  (USE BLACK INK) 
A. Details of person injured/involved (if patient, attach label here) 
 
Full Name …………………………………………………………..     
 If staff member, job title/grade ……………………………………….. 
 
Address
. 
Report No             
   INCIDENT REPORT FORM (IRF) 
(Admin Use)             
 CHRISTIE HOSPITAL NHS TRUST 
 
  …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………….… 
 
Telephone No ……………………………………………………….     
 Hospital No ……………………………………………………………………. 
 
Date of Birth ………………………………………………………….                Consultant 
……………………………………………………………………… 
 
Sex:            Male                 Female  
 
Inpatient   Outpatient   Day Case   Staff 
  Visitor   Other (specify) 
           
                                           
………………………………. 
 
 
B. Description of Incident, including immediate action taken following incident (continue on a separate 
sheet if necessary) 
No of attached sheets ………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Date of Incident ……………………………….   Time ……………………..       am    pm   Location 
……………………………………………………………………… 
 
Name/address of any witnesses 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
….  (attach witness statements if appropriate) 
Incident reported to ………………………………………………………   Designation 
………………………………………………… Date ………………………………………… 
Person completing IRF …………………………………………………..   Designation 
…………………………………………………Date  ………………………………………… 
            
    Signature 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C. Did the person receive any attention? (e.g.  treatment, advice, counselling, etc)  
If accident, this section MUST be completed by OHD, A&E or doctor on site 
 
None   First Aid   Occ.Health   A&E 
  Advised to see own GP   Other (specify below) 
 
Details: 
 
 
Treatment given by:          
     Occupation: 
 
(print name)           
     Signature: 
  
 
D. Details of any Medication involved in incident 
 
Name of Drug: ………………………………………………………………….    Route of Entry: 
………………………………………Dose ………………………… 
Type of Drug:  ………………………………………………………………….                      Research Trial:       Yes       
 No   
E. Details of any equipment involved in incident (keep supporting evidence) 
 
Type of equipment  ……………………………………………………….   
 Manufacturer ………………………………………………………………… 
Sent for repair?    Yes   No     
    Model ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Retained for inspection?  Yes   No      
   Serial No. ……………………………………………………………………… 
Present location of equipment ………………………………………………………  Batch/Lot Number 
…………………………………………………………… 
 
F. Security incident/loss/damage/ex-gratia claims 
 
Head of Security informed?   Yes   No     
     
Police contacted?     Yes   No   
     Crime Ref No: ………………………………………………………….. 
 
Detail loss/damage 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………... 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Is an ex-gratia claim required?      Yes   No 
  
Receipts/proof of repair or replacement provided? Yes   No   
 Estimated value £ ……………………. 
 
  
 
 
FOLLOWING SECTIONS G – J MUST BE COMPLETED BY MANAGER WITHIN 48 HOURS OF  
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT OCCURRING AND FORM SENT TO RISK MANAGEMENT TEAM 
WITHOUT DELAY 
 
G. Outline any remedial or other action taken following the incident to 
remove the hazard or prevent the incident occurring again  
 (give brief details) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Was a risk assessment in place before the incident?  Yes  No            If yes, has this 
assessment been reviewed?  Yes  No  
H.  If a member of staff, will he/she be absent from duties? (if appropriate) 
No    Yes    →  Normal hours expected to 
work on day of incident  …………………… 
        →  Actual hours worked on 
day of incident     ………………….. 
Will they be absent for more than 3 days as a result of the incident?     
No    Not yet known   Yes   → 
 First day of absence     ………………….. 
            
 →  Date of return to work (if known) …………………..   
I. Particulars of any injury or ill Health sustained by person identified in Section A (if 
appropriate) 
Abrasion/graze     Bruise/swelling    Burn/scald   
   Fracture     Laceration/cut     Exposure     
 
Needlestick       Sprain/strain    Other (specify) 
………………………………………………………………… 
 
Part(s) of the body affected (specify) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
   
J. Identify the priority of incident by circling the relevant one (refer to Adverse Incident/Near–miss Reporting Policy) 
 
5-major event*  4-moderate event*       3-minor event (minor injury incurred) 2-minor event 
(no injury incurred 1-near miss 
 
* If necessary apply Major Incident Policy 
 
 
Manager’s name:  …………………………………………………….    Signature : 
….…………………….     Date: ……………………………
  
 
FOR ADMINISTRATION USE 
Date IRF received:…………………………………………..         
  Entered on DATIX by: …………………………………………..      
     
Type of Incident:…………………………………………….  
 
If applicable type of loss or damage to property:  
 
 
 
 
Item(s) lost or damaged: 
 
 
 
 
Insurance claim initiated ? Yes   No      
  Updated records? 
 
 
Ex-gratia payment authorised?  Yes   No     
 Value £ ………………………………….. 
 
Signature of Director of  Finance ……………………………………………………. Date   
…………………………………………. 
 
Chq req. no:            
   Signed ………………………………………  Date……………………………… 
REPORTED TO: 
 
HSE            
  
      
   
  
   Infection Control
  
      MHRA 
  
   
Moving & Handling Co-ordinator     
  
   
  
  NPSA 
           
   Strategic HA
     
  
  
  
 Other (specify) ………………………………………………………… 
 
RIDDOR reportable?   YES       NO 
    Form F2508    or  Form F2508A  
  
  
  
 Accident 
  
  Disease
  
  Dangerous Occurrence
  
 
Ref no. allocated by reporting body ……………………………………… Date reported 
……………………………………….. 
 
ROOT CAUSES 
CODE DESCRIPTION CODE DESCRIPTION 
1.1 Diagnosis compromised by unavailability of record/results
  
4.5 APPRAISAL process 
1.2 Adverse result or diagnostic image available but not 
acted on 
4.6 DISCIPLINARY process 
1.3 Diagnosis did not account for ALL the known symptoms 5.1 No person took adequate overall responsibility for care 
1.4 Diagnosis or assessment inaccurate due to clinician error 5.2 Clinician did not seek supervision when 
indicated/required 
1.5 Patient had latent condition not normally diagnosed by 
assessment 
5.3 Supervision sought but not available 
2.1 Inadequate arrangements were made for known higher-
risk patient 
5.4 Fault with the system of communication with other 
teams/agencies 
2.2 Staff of grade appropriate for level of risk were not 
available 
5.5 System of referral to another service/specialty/team 
member 
2.3 Staff undertook work outside their 
grade/expertise/experience 
5.6 Other team factors (please specify) 
2.4 Clinician was a known risk of performance below level for 
grade 
6.1 Unavailability or failure of any facility or equipment 
3.1 No relevant guideline in force 6.2 Unmet training need 
3.2 Guideline in force but not available 6.3 Care compromised by unavailability of staff 
  
3.3 Guideline available but not followed 6.4 Workload exceeds capacity of planned staffing levels 
3.4 Guideline followed was incorrect or inadequate 6.5 Fault with the process for control of dangerous 
drugs/substances 
4.1 ENGAGEMENT process for locum/temporary/bank staff 6.6 Defect in premises or layout 
4.2 RECRUITMENT process for permanent staff 6.7 Fault with the process for identifying patients 
4.3 INDUCTION process 6.8 Other work environment or resource factors (please 
specify) 
4.4 SUPERVISION or mentoring process   
 
  
FOR SENIOR MANAGER USE 
(Investigation to be undertaken and concluded within 1 month of the date of the accident / incident) 
 
Sent to: …………………………………………………………………..(Senior Manager)   
     Date: ……………………………………….. 
 
To be returned by :……………………………………………………. 
 
Please clarify the following points: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If priority 1 or 2, then no further investigation is required unless the Senior Manager feels this is 
necessary.   
Priority incidents 1 and 2 should be investigated further if trend analyses indicate this is required. 
Priority 3, 4 and 5 incidents must be investigated further. 
 
Results of Investigation  : 
(For assistance see section 7 of the Adverse Incident / Near Miss Reporting Policy) 
A. What happened? (please clarify details of incident if not clear on page 1) 
Confirm priority of incident (Refer to Adverse Incident / Near-Miss Reporting Policy) 
 
5-major event *  4-moderate event *      3-minor event (minor injury incurred) 2-minor event 
  
 
 
 
 
 
B. How did it happen 
 
 
 
 
C. Why did it happen? 
 
 
 
D. Recommendations/Action plan/Actions implemented (together with dates) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
E. Further action proposed (consider whether a risk assessment is required) 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………... 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
ROOT CAUSE(S) ________________ (please select appropriate code from list on page 3) N.B. THIS MUST BE 
COMPLETED 
Investigator’s name ……………………………………………  Investigator’s signature 
…………………………   Date …………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix J 
Changes made to the questionnaire 
 
• Removal of the question which asked – in which clinical area do you 
work? This was changed to which of the following staff group do you 
belong? This allowed the same information to be gained, while ensuring 
that staff maintained complete anonymity. 
• The question which asked – how long staff had worked for the trust was 
amended, reducing the number of options. 
• The numbers of possible responses were reduced for question 6, from 
very confident, confident, not so confident and not at all confident. These 
were changed to a yes or no response because it would make analysis 
simpler.   
•  The question, Do you consider the Trust to be a learning organisation? was 
changed because it was not understood by all of the nursing staff. 
 
  
• The question- In your view which of the following best describes this 
organisation’s culture? The response open culture and closed culture was 
cut because of a lack of understanding of these terms. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix K 
The respondents were asked to consider this model (SWOT) and complete before 
the interview.   
                    The Christie NHS Foundation Trust- SWOT analysis 
Strengths     Weaknesses 
• Strong Christie brand 
• Designated “Lead Cancer 
Centre”  
• Network of chemotherapy 
services 
• High reputation of clinical 
leaders 
• Monopoly provider of 
radiotherapy and chemotherapy 
• Nationally designated centre for 
complex surgery 
• International reputation for 
clinical research 
• Second largest hospital charity in 
England 
• Sound financial position 
(appendix C) 
• NHS Litigation Authority( NHSLA) 
Level III 
• Not on an acute hospital site 
• High level of donated assets 
• Complexity of patient pathways, 
reliance on other trusts to 
achieve 62 day cancer waiting 
times target 
• Clinical outcome data difficult to 
manage so that its meaningful. 
• Dependent on highly specialised 
staff  
• According to NPSA limited 
incident reporting (8% of 
admissions).  
• Lack of a web- based reporting 
system (plans already made to 
address this). 
 
Opportunities Threats 
• Strategic vision supported by • Provider competition  
External 
Internal environment 
  
national commissioners 
• Growing demand  
• Expansion of radiotherapy 
capacity 
• Network plan for surgery  
• Expansion of chemotherapy 
network provision 
• Public support for local “The 
Christie at…” services 
• Manchester Cancer Research 
Centre (MCRC) partnership 
• Manchester versus Cancer 
alliance 
• Unconfirmed tariff 
• Affordability to commissioners of 
growing demand  
• Increased patient expectations 
• Rapid developments in drug 
technology  
• More high cost drugs 
• Changes in NHS R&D funding  
• Changing financial climate 
 
 
        (Source: Director of Nursing and Clinical Governance and Author, 2009)  
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